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ABSTRACT

Downside-Upside Duality:
The Role Of Ambidexterity In Enterprise Risk Management
BY
Emanuel V. Lauria, Jr.
JULY 7, 2015

Committee Chair:

Conrad S. Ciccotello

Major Academic Unit:

J. Mack Robinson College of Business

Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a widely studied management control process,
representing an important advancement from the traditional methods by which firms control the
risks they face. This study steps back from attempts to quantify the relationship between ERM
and firm performance. Instead, it explores how non-financial institutions with significant time
and resource commitments to ERM configure those resources to effectuate a downside-upside
duality as ERM is adopted, using for the first time in ERM research the theoretical lens of
ambidexterity as a dynamic capability. This duality is the simultaneous engagement in mitigating
existing and emerging risks while pursuing new value contributions from risk management
processes. Empirical evidence indicates that the downside-upside duality is asymmetric, and
challenges exist in quantifying the upside. The upside value component is most closely
associated with raising the level of the risk discourse in firms. This is accomplished structurally
by establishing new ERM-focused organizational subunits, and contextually by stretching
capabilities. Dynamic capabilities emerge as firms sense, seize and reconfigure resources in the
operationalization of ERM to supplant core competencies associated with traditional modes of
risk management. Practitioners will gain from this research a richer understanding of the fit, form
and function of ERM informed by empirical data and extrinsic theory.
Keywords: ERM, ambidexterity, value, dynamic capabilities, upside, downside
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I

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Exposure to the probability and severity of adverse events, or simply, to risk, is an unavoidable
condition in the flow of commerce (Kulp, 1928). Risk is most often defined by its potential for
negative outcomes (Athearn, 1971) as in “the chance of injury, damage or loss; dangerous
chance, hazard” (Webster, 2014) and “a person or thing regarded as a threat or source of danger
(“Risk,” 2010). This downside directional characteristic of risk in organizations (Barton, Shenkir
& Walker, 2001; Beasley, Branson & Hancock, 2012; Francis & Paladino, 2008; March &
Shapira, 1987; Stulz, 1996) manifests as exposure to human, property and financial losses, and in
the disruption of the pursuit of business goals and strategies (Purdy, 2010; Rao & Marie, 2007).
A positive correlation is usually assumed of risk and the chance of loss. When there is too much
risk facing the firm, or the plans to deal with such excessive levels of risk are inadequate, longterm survival is threatened.
Encountering risk, and the consequences that follow, may be thought of in a bipolar
sense, however. Downside loss potential arising from risk arguably has an inverse, which is the
possibility of an upside benefit (Anderson, 2008, 2009; Fraser & Simkins, 2007; Paladino, Cuy
& Frigo, 2009; Sobel & Reding, 2004; Verbano & Venturini, 2011). “Nothing ventured, nothing
gained” and the tradeoff of “risk and reward” (S&P, 2008) are familiar aphorisms that translate
into organizational settings. Under the right conditions the presence of risk, rather than its
elimination, may have the means to become a vehicle for accretive value delivery, although
given its contingent liability nature, such conditions are “not now fixed and absolute, but which
will become so in case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event” (Black, 1990).
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The way in which a firm chooses to define and mobilize its response to risk (Athearn,
1971), whether by strictly minimizing the downside only effects or by concomitantly pursuing an
explicit contribution to upside gain, is a decision with strategic implications. Resolving this
choice will be an essential factor in determining how risk is managed.
Risk management, as it is customarily conducted, is a blend of art and science (Bernstein,
1998) commonly referred to as “traditional risk management”, or TRM. When in the TRM
mode, risk management acts as a downside control function, accomplishing this purpose through
defensively oriented approaches that reduce or remove risk (Andersen, 2008; Barton et al., 2001;
Gatzert & Martin, 2013; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). Commercial insurance purchasing to
transfer risk contractually is a recognized, integral component of the practice of TRM. Insurance
buying cycles, in which the availability and affordability of insurance products are major
contributors to establishing the firm’s total cost of risk calculus, play a prominent role in guiding
the TRM process (Colquitt, Hoyt & Lee, 1999).
Beyond diminishing the negative outcomes of risk addressed by TRM is a proposition for
organizations to capture an upside advantage from risk. To realize such benefits, a notable trend
in risk management is for companies to expand the scope of its practice. This redefined scope is
captured under the umbrella term of enterprise risk management, or ERM (Power, 2007). Either
independently or in tandem with other management control processes (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014),
ERM is adduced for its potential to preserve, enhance or create value by positively impacting
various aspects of firm performance (Arena, Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2010; Kraus & Lehner, 2012;
Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Pagach & Warr, 2010b; Scherzer & Mackay, 1998).
Plans to capture this additional risk-based utility are not fulfilled without significant
institutional effort, however. In the transition from downward facing TRM to the bidirectional
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modality of ERM, firms undergo a change process to inculcate ERM that stretches over a
multiyear period. Companies choosing to pursue ERM strategies are faced with capability,
infrastructure and resource development tasks to enable the simultaneous execution of both
traditional downside risk management activities and to embrace new enterprise-wide upside
dimensions (Nair, Rustambekov, McShane & Farnschmidt, 2013). ERM adoption produces a
management dilemma that is recognized in other research domains: to attain an acceptable level
of congruency between the “exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old
certainties” (March, 1991).
I.1

Focus of Study

This dissertation is focused on examining the resolution of the downside-upside duality in ERM.
Through a qualitative analysis of companies having earned reputations of significant
commitments to ERM, I will apply theories of collective action to the risk management arena to
address the control and the value contribution dimensions of ERM. In so doing, this dissertation
seeks to develop a solid conceptualization of what ERM is, in all its richness, informed by
extrinsic theory and empirical evidence.
Organizational ambidexterity will be used as a theoretical lens to explicate the change on
resource configurations resulting from the transformation of TRM methods to an ERM platform
(Burkinshaw & Gupta, 2013; Duncan, 1976; Junni, Sarala, Taras & Tarba, 2013; O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008, 2011, 2013; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). With its roots in the work of Duncan
(1976) and March (1991) on the challenges facing firms to shift structures and adapt to changing
conditions, ambidexterity is the simultaneous engagement in exploitation and exploration
activities. As such, it affords a useful framework to analyze the concept of ERM, in which the
exploitative efficiency and control mechanisms of TRM coexist with the exploratory, innovative
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ways to add the value desired of ERM. To paraphrase Levinthal & March (1993), the basic risk
management problem confronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to
ensure that adequate control over the current risk environment is maintained and, at the same
time, to devote enough energy toward exploration to capitalize on opportunities in future risk
environments. ERM offers a potential solution to this challenge.
In this research, the prospect of ERM ambidexterity is considered from the perspective of
dynamic capabilities (Jansen, Tempelaar, van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009), O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2013). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) characterize dynamic capabilities as “the
firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address
rapidly changing environments”. Dynamic capabilities are distinguished from core
competencies, which are the routines fundamental to maintaining a status quo competitive
position (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Instead, dynamic capabilities enable firms to sense and
seize new opportunities through decisions made by senior management to reallocate
organizational resources (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013).
I.2

Research Design

As presented by Van de Ven (2007), this study takes the form of informed basic research, in
which the social phenomenon being described is the outcome of a change in organizational
architecture effectuated by the adoption of a new management process. The researcher is outside
of the institutional system of companies under study. Perspectives of various stakeholders
besides the interviewees, including practitioners and scholars, will be considered in the
development of this study. The researcher will maintain control of all activities related to this
research. The candidate is an experienced ERM practitioner with a desire to make a unique
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contribution to theory and to inform practice, the combination of which is at the heart of engaged
scholarship.
The study is focused on examining a small sample of institutions that have demonstrated
serious commitments to the practice of ERM over a multiyear period, without judging how well
this task has been accomplished. The evidence of continuing engagement in ERM itself creates a
sufficient platform to support the research question. Rather, it is to understanding the resultant
shift in organizational architecture that occurs to enable firms to adjust to the expectations of
ERM effectiveness, and in particular for these companies to accommodate the bi-directional
conception of risk contemplated by ERM.
I have undertaken an interpretive approach to this study at the firm level of analysis.
Since the research question is “how” organizational change has taken place, a process study is
necessary to explain observed sequences of events (Abbott, 1990). Accordingly, the focus will be
upon progressions rather than a category of concepts concerned with variables that seek to
explain change has occurred (Van de Ven 2007, p.196).
A heterogeneous group of four non-financial public institutions, a less documented sector
in the literature (Arena et al., 2010), has been assembled to represent the field of highly
experienced organizational practitioners of ERM. Three industrial enterprises and one higher
education institution comprise the sample. The industrial organizations are public companies in
the S&P 500-size category, and the university is a major teaching and research facility. These
firms were selected from a population of businesses that have acknowledged their conduct of
formal ERM programs through multi-year commitments resulting in substantive changes to
people, processes, and practices. With four cases, this qualitative study will not necessarily be
generalizable to the overall population of non-financial institution firms, but will attempt to have
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analytic, or theoretical, and between-case generalizability. The cases were chosen on a
conceptual basis, rather than on representative grounds. Further, multiple variations are made
possible given the diversity of the cases.
Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with experienced risk
management professionals under full-time employment with each firm. These professionals have
intimate historical knowledge of their firms’ adoption and implementation of ERM, as well
ongoing involvement in the execution of ERM strategies. Data gathering consistency was guided
by a series of pre-determined interview questions. Audio recordings were conducted, and
transcriptions made for each interview session where consent was granted, and by the “pen and
paper approach” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p.117) in the remaining cases. NVIVO 10 was
utilized to manage the data analysis process for the complete data set.
Triangulation was accomplished through the development of multiple data sources (Yin,
1994). Secondary data, including internal presentations, archival records, publicly available
information from company websites and industry practitioner surveys were reviewed. The study
employs the qualitative data analysis methods presented by Miles & Huberman (2014) for
guidance in data reduction, creating data displays and drawing and verifying conclusions.
I.3

Contributions

ERM is acclaimed as a significant evolutionary step in management processes, with the promise
of creating value that is accretive to firm performance. However, risk professionals are faced
with a myriad of guidelines, definitions, frameworks and standards as they evaluate the potential
effectiveness of an ERM program. Moreover, the downside-upside duality expected of ERM
calls for reassessments of how risk management resources and capabilities are deployed, adding
complexity to ERM adoption and implementation. This study seeks to equip practitioners to
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more effectively in their firms manage the fit, form and function of the advanced risk
management activities resident in ERM. It is intended to provide insight into how firms
configure to achieve the control and value propositions of ERM simultaneously, to inform earlystage ERM adopters of the possible solutions available to them, and to assist executives in
considering appropriate approaches and expectations for ERM implementation. Lastly, the
findings of this research may lead to a further explication of the relationship of ERM to firm
performance, enabling new avenues to quantification efforts.
Theories of collective action have seldom been applied to the study of risk management
in organizations, despite the ubiquitous impact of risk on operations, strategy, and decisionmaking. This study may make several contributions to ambidexterity theory. The first is by
extending ambidexterity to the downside-upside duality in ERM, utilizing this construct as a
proxy for exploitation and exploration (Junni et al., 2013). Second, observing how the internal
process of ambidexterity is achieved, by means that are sequential, structural or contextual
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013), or leadership based (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008), or as a
combination thereof (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013) will bring further clarity to the effectuation of
its modes. Lastly, evidence of how ERM ambidexterity is operationalized through various
resource allocation activities will respond to calls in the literature for a more transparent
understanding of the process (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013).
I.4

Dissertation Structure

This remainder of this study is organized into the following chapters:
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I.4.1

Literature review.

Commencing with an exploration of the conceptual origins of risk, I then trace the emergence
and development of the two primary managerial responses to organizational risk: traditional risk
management (TRM) and enterprise risk management (ERM).
I.4.2

Theoretical perspectives.

Two theories of collective action, ambidexterity, and dynamic capabilities, will also be reviewed
to establish their application to the downside-upside duality brought forth by the adoption of
ERM. The section concludes with an examination of practitioner surveys and case studies for
initial evidence of ambidexterity in ERM.
I.4.3

Analytical framing.

Based on the literature review, a definition of ERM described as an emerging consensus of three
dimensions has taken shape: a holistic dimension that specifies the importance of risk
integration, a horizon dimension encompassing emerging and existing risks, and a harmonization
dimension in which the downside control of risk is maintained in simultaneity with the pursuit of
upside value. In this chapter, I introduce a three-phase adoption process of ERM, adapted from a
practitioner capability maturity model designed specifically for ERM applications. These three
phases, motivation, advancement, and assimilation, describe a developmental process during
which firms decide to engage in, allocate resources to and facilitate embedment of ERM into the
organization. It is with the assimilation phase that we are concerned, as it encompasses
companies that have extensive experience with implementing ERM. Through the lens of
ambidexterity as a dynamic capability, this study explores how firms that have committed to
ERM practices over the long term, assimilation, configure resources to address the downsideupside duality of harmonization.
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I.4.4

Research methods.

Undertaken in this chapter are a description of the case study design, data sources, data
collection, and data analysis. First, the research design is a qualitative, interpretive study
conducted at the firm level of analysis. Second, the primary data source is a sample of four nonfinancial institutions that have demonstrated multiyear commitments to ERM. Representing each
organization were two senior risk management professionals with direct knowledge of their
firms’ conduct of ERM. Publicly available and internal archival information for these institutions
was accessed as well. Third, data collection was accomplished through semi-structured
interviews with each of the eight risk management professionals, utilizing an interview protocol
to promote consistency. Lastly, the Miles and Huberman (2014) method of coding cycles guided
the data analysis.
I.4.5

Results.

In this chapter are the findings from the empirical evidence gathered directly through the
interviews and informed by the review of the secondary information, arising from the data
analysis process. Beginning with a summary of the demographics of the sample, I explore how
each company has moved through the motivation and advancement stages of ERM adoption to
arrive at its current resource configuration in the assimilation phase. Implicit in this examination
is the emerging consensus model of ERM, the ways in which these firms recognize and
understand the nature of downside and upside risk, and how value is conceptualized. At the locus
of the assimilation phase of the ERM implementation process and the harmonization dimension
of the consensus model as it applies to the companies in the sample are major patterns and
themes that reveal the workings of ambidexterity. Further, the core competencies and path
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dependencies resident in downside TRM activities are contrasted with the generation of dynamic
capabilities as ERM is implemented.
I.4.6

Discussion and contributions.

In this section I synthesize and discuss the findings in light of the literature review, the
theoretical framework, and the research question: How do firms reconfigure assets, resources
and capabilities in the operationalization of ERM to consider both the downside and upside of
risk? The discussion includes a summary of theoretical and practice-based contributions.
I.4.7

Concluding remarks and limitations.

I offer observations on the implications of this research, discuss the limitations of the study and
the potential applicability of the findings to other populations and propose future pathways for
ERM research.
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II

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Positioning of Research
This study does not seek to follow the dominant flow of ERM research. Instead, it is motivated
by a decision to step back from the attempts to quantify the relationship of ERM to firm
performance (Kraus & Lehner, 2012), particularly in the financial services sector, which have
received relatively extensive attention from ERM researchers. Although numerous studies
attempt to establish a causal relationship between ERM and the multidimensional concept of
firm performance (He & Wong, 2004), there is not yet a consensus about how the relationship
works despite the intuitive sensibility imputed to engaging in ERM (Mikes, 2014). Disentangling
the complexity of ERM embedment in companies to determine the significance of its influence
on firm performance has become a challenging goal. Market level measurements of the
relationship have yielded some positive findings. However, ERM performance metrics based on
return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and risk adjusted
return on capital (RAROC) are difficult to apply to non-financial firms engaging in ERM (RIMS,
2014). In comparison, these calculative hurdles are less apparent in banks and insurance carriers,
for which capital-based ERM models are available (Segal, 2011, p. 83).
Empirical evidence describing the apparatus that links the conduct of ERM activities to
improvements in firm performance has been slow to emerge (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014). Since the
ERM knowledge base itself is arguably in a pre-paradigmatic state, quantitative approaches to
measuring the relationship may be premature (Kraus & Lehner, 2012). Difficulties in defining
meaningful variables and determining relevant proxies (Kraus & Lehner, 2012), the lack of ERM
measurement standards (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014), the potential biasing influence of endogeneity
(Bromiley, McShane, Nair & Rustambekov, 2014), the impact of firm- and industry-specific
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characteristics (Woon, Azizan, & Samad, 2010), and the presence of potentially significant
moderating and mediating variables situated between ERM and firm performance (Baron &
Kenny, 1986, Edmonson & McManus, 2007; Gordon, Loeb & Tseng, 2009) have led to mixed
empirical results. Failures to find significant linkage are represented in the literature (Kraus &
Lehner, 2012; Mikes & Kaplan, 2014), as are claims of the successful demonstration of positive
relationships. For example, Hoyt and Libenberg (2011) in a study of U.S. insurers using Tobin’s
Q as a proxy for firm value find evidence of enhanced shareholder value as a result of ERM
adoption. Farrell and Gallagher (2014) explore the relationship between firm value and advanced
states of ERM maturity in a mixed industry sample of public companies. Again utilizing Tobin’s
Q, they argue that a significant value premium is associated with higher levels of ERM maturity.
Grace, Leverty, Phillips and Shrimpi (2014) in an insurance industry study identify three specific
ERM initiatives that produce the greatest increase in firm value: ERM that is simple in approach;
the employment of a dedicated risk manager; and the risk management function reporting
directly to the CEO or to the board.
Impacting the issue of value quantification are two additional data conceptualization
quandaries that could potentially uncover deeper insight into the contribution of ERM: first, the
counterfactual problem (Baron, 1999; Epstude & Roese, 2008) inherent to measuring the “but
for” impact of preventative management control processes such as are inherent in ERM (RIMS,
2011), and second, the alignment and tracking of ERM-specific contributions to strategic
decision outcomes, which as a data collection activity in non-ERM terms has eluded
management researchers (Schrage, 2003; Segal, 2011, p. 226).
ERM literature is evolving and broad. It spans risk management, insurance, economics,
accounting, law, psychology and human resources journals, as well as numerous practitioner
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publications and industry white papers. Nonetheless, there are relatively few qualitative,
empirical studies of ERM from the perspective of collective action theories. The instant research
is the first to explore the downside-upside duality of ERM as an expression of ambidexterity, in
which exploitative and exploratory forces compete for organizational resources. Management
theory-based research into ERM adoption has the potential to make a meaningful contribution by
deepening our understanding how ERM works in situ (Bromiley et al., 2014; Denenberg &
Ferrari, 1966). Applying ambidexterity to frame the evolving nature of ERM will lead to an
atypical understanding of how ERM is effectuated. In so doing, value components, and in turn,
relational measurements on the impact on firm performance can hopefully be assessed with
increased clarity, as the formative components of ERM are unveiled more thoroughly.
Management effects, then, rather than in-depth coverage of contemporary risk treatments
are prioritized hereunder. In the mix of the technical and managerial factors that compose ERM,
the emphasis will be on “e-r-M” rather than “e-R-m”. Included within this management domain
are matters of basic economic intuition, which have also seldom been addressed in ERM studies
(C. Ciccotello, personal communication, October 24, 2014). Risk ownership and corresponding
financial incentives (Lam, 2003; Nocco & Stulz, 2006), cost-benefit analyses of ERM
sustainment, and the systemic economic friction generated from the change management
activities to adopt ERM are factors that may impact its efficacy.
The choice to follow this line of management principle-oriented research complements
the more extensive coverage of various aspects of risk quantification that are examined in the
literature. Calculations of risk appetite, risk tolerance, risk bearing capacity and risk correlation,
for example, circumscribe the boundaries of the consolidated risk exposure profile of the
organization (Segal, 2011). Against these measures do management act to align its resources and
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execute its risk strategies. Thus, the author will endeavor to answer the question: How do firms
reconfigure assets, resources and capabilities in the operationalization of ERM to consider both
the downside and upside of risk?
Represented by the literature streams reviewed are five particular studies that motivate
the goals of this research. First, Mikes & Kaplan (2014) offer skepticism of the repeated attempts
to quantify the linkage between ERM and firm performance. Their criticism points to the use of
weak variables to measure complex organizational behavior, and an insufficient understanding of
how risk management industry frameworks are adopted and implemented. The authors cite the
need to further “unpack the ERM mix” as a means to clarify the relationship among the
execution of ERM processes and any measurable impact on outcomes. They propose a
contingency theory framework that links contingent variables and ERM practices.
Second, in their 2014 study, Bromiley et al. posit an “emerging consensus”, distilling
three core elements of the literature and practice to define the essence of ERM: the efficiency of
managing risks as a corporate portfolio, widening the scope of risk to encompass those that are
non-traditional, and pursuing competitive advantage from the management of risk. The authors
also cite the significant opportunity for management theory to contribute to the evolving ERM
corpus.
Third, Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008), in their review of the research, develop a
comprehensive framework that links the building blocks of organizational ambidexterity.
Structural, contextual and leadership antecedents enable ambidexterity to situate in firms through
organizational learning, technological innovation, adaptation, strategic management and
organizational design. Impacting the expected performance outcomes resulting from the
engagement in ambidexterity are environmental factors and other moderating variables.
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Fourth, to address the question of how firms survive as they encounter change, O’Reilly
and Tushman (2008) draw from the separate research streams on strategy and organizational
design. The strategic perspective suggests that dynamic capabilities, which are the capacity of a
firm to reconfigure assets and capabilities, offer an explanation of competitive advantage over
time. Alternatively, based on organizational design research, ambidexterity, the ability of a firm
to synchronously explore and exploit, is proposed to facilitate longitudinal adaptation. The
authors integrate the research streams to suggest how ambidexterity takes the form of a dynamic
capability.
Lastly, in one of few studies to introduce management theory to ERM research, Nair et
al. (2013) propose ERM as a dynamic capability in crisis environments. The authors argue that
the ERM and dynamic capabilities share certain characteristics, especially in respect to sensing
opportunities and threats in the environment. In combination, these five articles comprise a new
approach to examining the initiation and practice of ERM.
II.2 Traditional Risk Management
From its origins as risque in 17th century France (“Risk,” 2010), the evolution of the term “risk”
has been marked by differing approaches to its nature among scholars in insurance, finance, and
economics. Most definitions of risk share in common a future temporal dimension and
expectations of unfavorable outcomes (Athearn, 1971). However, theoretical complications arise
as elements of loss, chance, probability, possibility, and in particular, uncertainty, are considered
in defining risk (Athearn, 1971; Crowe & Horn, 1967; Wood, 1964). Conceptualizations of risk
as the chance of damage or loss (Haynes, 1895), the chance of loss, as uncertainty, or the chance
or the uncertainty of loss (Wood, 1964), a combination of hazards, a variance concept or the
possibility of an unfortunate occurrence (Crowe & Horne, 1967), the possibility that a sentient
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entity will incur loss (Crowe & Horn, 1967) and the exposure to a proposition of which one is
uncertain (Holton, 2004) illustrate the historical inconsistencies and lack of agreement found in
the literature (Crowe & Horn, 1967).
One of the most significant contributions to explicating the concept of risk is that made
by Frank H. Knight in his work, Risk Uncertainty and Profit (1921):
To preserve the distinction…between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable
one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the term uncertainty for the
latter. (p.233)
Knight uses both the ability and the inability to quantify the possibility of a phenomenon as a
means to associate risk and uncertainty, as well as to distinguish between the terms (Holton,
2004). He further articulates his view in familiar language:
We can also employ the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ probability to designate the
risk and uncertainty, respectively… . (Wood, 1964)
While theoretical definitions of risk differ among researchers, there appears to be general
agreement on a dichotomy of risk with respect to economic activity. Pure risks are those that
involve the potential for generating loss only. In contrast, speculative risks are those in which a
possibility of both loss and gain exists (Denenberg & Ferrari, 1966; Gahin, 1967; Wood, 1964).
The importance of this distinction, recognized by economists in the late 19th century in
discussions of entrepreneurial profit motives (Gahin, 1967; Wood, 1964), is central to
understanding one of the primary attributes proposed through the adoption of ERM.
In a commercial context, risk is a multidimensional construct. In firms, it may be clearly
known, or exist below the threshold of institutional perception. Certain risks are represented
broadly across industry sectors and others are highly specific to companies of a particular profile.
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Organizational risk can be as simple to conceive as the potential for damage to plant, property
and equipment, and as complex as the interconnections among global supply chains. Since a
riskless environment rarely exists (Crowe & Horn, 1967), managers must act to harness risk to
survive and maintain competitiveness in the marketplace. A properly constructed risk
management function enables firms to take a programmatic approach to risk-focused activities,
to effectively configure risk-oriented resources and to promote formal recognition of the
importance of these processes. In the next section begins an examination of how risk is formally
addressed in companies.
The roots of traditional risk management (TRM) in the literature extend back to the postWorld War II era (Dickenson, 2001; Gallagher, 1956; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). From this
early period forward, the determinants of TRM have been closely associated with procedures
directed at preserving the assets and earning potential of the organization (Gallagher, 1956). In
the TRM model, mid-level corporate risk managers are typically charged with controlling
insurance buying costs and executing risk abatement activities that are targeted at minimizing the
negative consequences of risk. These management processes have, over many decades, become
core competencies (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008) to ensure efficient, cost-effective protection.
Management of risk costs in TRM is accomplished through structured financial risk
transfer programs, often of annual duration. Various combinations of commercial insurance
products and self-insurance mechanisms, including deductibles, retentions and captives are
frequently employed (Colquitt, Hoyt & Lee, 1999). As a result, the availability and affordability
of insurance products tend to set the pace of the TRM agenda. These cyclical insurance buying
patterns create path dependencies that have become well established in industry, characterized by
rising, or “hard market”, and falling, or “soft market” price levels. Importantly, such contractual
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risk transfer mechanisms are designed to indemnify the firm for losses incurred from pure, or
hazard-based risks exclusively (Colquitt et al., 1999; Gahin, 1967; Haller, 1978; McShane, Nair
& Rustambekov, 2011; Scherzer & Mackay, 1998; Verbano & Venturini, 2011) where the
possibility of incurring loss is the sole outcome. Speculative risk taking that has a potential for
gain (Colquitt et al., 1999; Crockford, 2005; Haller, 1978; Verbano & Venturini, 2011; Wood,
1964), such as that occurring in strategic planning and decision making and company operations,
dwell outside of the philosophical underpinnings of insurance to solely make whole.
Several systematic routines are associated with TRM, often operating on parallel tracks,
and serve to focus management attention on the efficient handling of known risks. First,
supporting the insurance purchasing decision are various loss forecasting and actuarial tools that
are utilized to quantify the potential financial impact of risk and to optimize the balance of risk
retained and transferred by firms. Second, activities that engage the firm in the identification,
assessment, mitigation and monitoring of insurable risk are conducted on a regular basis. These
preventative and protective measures are designed to encompass pure risks, ultimately to reduce
exposures ex-ante by way of tactical schemes. For example, insurers of commercial properties
periodically inspect high-risk and high-value locations, making formal recommendations for
statutory code compliance and exposure improvement purposes. Failure to comply with the
recommendations promptly can negatively affect future insurability. Lastly, minimization of the
amount of actual losses incurred is administered ex-post in the claims adjudication process
through the adjustment of losses and settlement negotiations.
One well-documented characteristic of TRM is that the risks of a firm inhabit
organizational compartments, commonly referred to as “silos”. A silo is an organizational
subdivision, such as a discrete business unit or functional area. Silo may also refer to a risk
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classification such as treasury (Scherzer & Mackay, 1998), market, credit, liquidity risk
(Miccolis & Shah, 2000), hazard, financial, operational and strategic risk (Lam, 2001), foreign
exchange and commodity risk (Aabo, Fraser & Simkins, 2005), insurance, technological and
environmental risk (Rao & Marie, 2007) and human resources and supply chain risks (Mikes &
Kaplan, 2014). Silos are managed independently and to the best judgment of the individual silo
managers (Beasley et al, 2012; McShane et al., 2011; Meulbroek, 2002; Mikes, 2011; Simkins,
2008).
Within the silos resides the specialized, detailed knowledge of the risks inherent to that
particular subdivision, including responsibilities for measurement and mitigation (Mikes, 2005).
Consequently, the resource structures and expertise necessary to maintain adequate risk controls
in the silos are matters of localized consideration. In large part, they are unconnected from
similar determinations being made in other areas of the organization. For firms operating in a
TRM context, there are few incentives or a convenient forum for the individual silos to reach
past their boundaries to collaborate on upside facing activities to benefit the greater good of
value generation and enhanced firm performance.
Apart from the manner in which hazard-based TRM is conducted, corporate finance and
treasury departments also commonly engage in certain narrowly defined aspects of risk
management. For example, treasury departments often utilize derivative products to hedge
balance sheet exposures, interest rate, foreign exchange, and market and credit risks. (McShane
et al., 2011). Other functional management units, such as internal audit, human resources, and
information technology also have responsibility for managing the indigenous risks they face
(Banham, 2004). In particular, strategic and operational categories of risk are contemplated
outside of the TRM domain (McShane et al., 2011). When TRM is the prevailing system, these
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risk-related activities are not linked across the entirety of the business, to the point of different
departments often speaking in different tongues about risk (Scherzer & Mackay, 1998).
Notwithstanding its historical dominance of the corporate risk management landscape,
TRM functions as a management control process of limited organizational scope (Rao & Marie,
2007). It is focused on a company’s insurable hazard exposures that generate downside loss
potential from known risks (Dionne, 2013). From this TRM setting emerge core competencies,
those distinct processes that are essential to the efficient conduct of business (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008). In its relevance to the hierarchy of organizational processes, TRM is
subordinated to higher-level strategic planning and decision-making, and its relationship to them
is mainly through task structuring (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch & Schulz-Harris, 2003).
This effective decoupling often results in TRM becoming the “…department that says no,
brought in at the end of a decision process to validate a course of action” (Teach, 2013), or
alternatively, “maturity in risk management is when the company does its risk assessment when
it’s about to kick off a project, rather than doing it at the end” (HBR Analytical, 2011).
Significant institutional barriers exist to the consolidation of risks in TRM.
When companies consider how to derive additional benefits from their risk management
activities, a possible way forward is toward a post-TRM, pre-ERM stage. This incremental
progress can be facilitated by the employment of certain advanced risk financing techniques,
which provide avenues for value creation beyond the scope of TRM. For example, specialpurpose vehicles known as captives have been used for decades across industries to formalize the
self-insurance of risk by firms (Westover, 2002, p. 34). These entities, which could be
interpreted as pre-ERM evidence of structural ambidexterity, are established to enable companies
to pursue certain particular aspects of financial upside, such as tax arbitrage gains, increased cash
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flow and profit recapture (Westover, 2002, p. 60). Further, an alternative insurance market of
specialized integrated risk financing products exists, albeit highly selective in its capacity to
underwrite risk. By supporting the combination of traditional and non-traditional exposures, they
effectively work as an external integration mechanism across silos in a manner that TRM in
isolation does not promote. As I will later show, on occasion these types of financial mechanisms
can directly contribute to the initial organizational motivation to pursue ERM.
In summary, a robust loss control mindset and cost minimization of the financial impact
of known risks is evident in TRM, with a structure and resources compelled to produce such
outcomes. Cost savings, variance minimization (Bromiley et al., 2014), and “the reduction or
elimination of costly lower-tail outcomes” (Pagach & Warr, 2007) are among the primary
management goals of TRM. This defensive, variance reducing and efficiency seeking path
dependency of TRM form a downside, exploitative set of characteristics of firms. In contrast, we
now turn our attention to ERM, and how to its emergence has added an upward, exploratory
dimension to the practice of risk management.
II.3 Enterprise Risk Management
Influenced by a combination of practitioners and scholars beginning in the mid-1990s, a
movement gained traction that reshaped the thinking about what risk management is and how it
should operate. Embracing the view that risk management should have a more significant impact
on the firm beyond the cost of insurance minimization and hazard control contributions of TRM,
ERM in its various forms represents a meaningful evolution of the risk management mission. Its
emergence has introduced an era of “enlightened” risk management (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014) to
many companies responding to a turbulent global environment. Through the application of ERM
methods, senior leaders are empowered to pursue a top-down, integrated approach in

21

contemplating the full range of risks that they encounter. ERM is conceptualized as a boundaryspanning process impacting operations, strategy, finance, legal, regulatory, compliance and
internal audit functional areas. Industry surveys (Appendix 1) document the considerable level of
interest in ERM adoption. The Risk & Insurance Management Society (RIMS) argues that ERM
has reached critical mass on the adoption curve using Rogers’ model of innovation diffusion and
market acceptance (Rogers, 1995), a finding which is reinforced by the society’s own assessment
of the maturation of the practice (RIMS, 2013).
While the advent of ERM is acknowledged to have occurred within the last 20 years, the
seeds of what has now become ERM were sown many years earlier. Rennie (1961) argued that
corporate risk management should extend its brief to “all business risks”, and that the risk
manager should directly influence senior management’s decisions concerning expansion and
innovation. By reducing uncertainty through measurement techniques, “he [the risk manager]
can extend the growth horizons of the firm”, and must also be forward thinking with respect to
risks relating to “assets that are not yet in place, processes that are still in the blueprint stage and
to personnel who are not yet employed.” The author’s untitled conceptualization has proved
prescient, as its realization is found among the core principles of modern ERM.
ERM adoption and implementation is expected to encompass a broad risk management
utility spectrum, from continuing to execute on the downside control mechanisms of TRM to
enabling a broad range of upside performance gains (Gatzert & Martin, 2013; Nair, et al., 2013).
The elevated position of ERM in the matrix of institutional processes is proposed to offer a
source of competitive advantage (Beasley, Clune & Hermanson, 2005), enable firms to improve
performance (Gordon, Loeb & Tseng, 2009), strengthen corporate governance, internal controls
and external reporting (Arena et al., 2010; Fraser & Henry, 2007; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011;
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Mikes, 2009; Nocco & Stolz, 2006;), benefit decision-making (Arena et al., 2010), assume a role
in strategic decision-making (Mikes, 2009) and provide a pathway to achieve better operational
and strategic decision-making (Hoyt & Libenberg, 2011; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003).
ERM introduces a horizontal axis to the management of risk, intersecting vertical
structural and functional silos. By embedding ERM principles, a deliberate shift in risk
management strategy is made from the compartmentalization of risk to the convergence of risk
(Bromiley et al., 2014; Nocco & Stulz, 2006). Conceptual and working interpretations of what
constitutes ERM have developed over the past two decades, influenced by academia, industry,
consultants, regulators, association groups and higher education. Given the contributions of the
diverse constituencies involved in the promotion of ERM, multiple definitions, frameworks,
standards and guidelines have been promulgated. Indeed, the attribution of ERM as being fully
“enterprise” in nature may itself be an inflationary characterization (H. Weston, personal
communication, October 24, 2014). Consequently, that which constitutes ERM is a melting pot
of advanced risk management principles and proclamations that fall short of uniform expression.
Three of the most well-known expositions of ERM have been issued by the Casualty
Actuarial Society Committee on Enterprise Risk Management (CAS, 2003, p. 8), the 2004
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). First, the CAS value-based definition states
that:
ERM is the discipline by which an organization in an industry assesses, controls,
exploits, finances and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing the
organization’s short- and long-term value to its stakeholders.
Second, and in contrast, COSO articulates a direct linkage to firm strategy:
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Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors,
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
entity objectives. (Arena et al., 2010)
The COSO methodology is further developed in Enterprise Risk Management –
Integrated Framework. This guidance document presents a three-dimensional integrated model
that combines a defined set of corporate objectives, multitier compliance considerations, and
operational components. Beginning with a review of the internal environment of the firm,
recognition of its goals and event identification, the protocol then progresses to an assessment of
risks from which to develop management decision options. Four final steps present risk
mitigation measures characterized as risk response, control activities, information and
communication, and monitoring (COSO, 2004).
Lastly, ISO (2009) has authored a comprehensive set of standards applicable to ERM,
codified under ISO 31000:2009 and along with it, a new compendium of terms entitled ISO
73:2009 (Leitch, 2010; Purdy, 2010;). Guidance for ISO 31000 originated with
AS/NZS4360:2004, the Australia and New Zealand standard that has itself become widely
considered in organizational risk management. The goals of implementing ISO 31000 are
numerous, including: improvements in risk assessment, financial reporting, governance,
compliance, stakeholder relationships, controls, operational efficiency and effectiveness, loss
prevention, learning, resilience and resource allocation; loss minimization; creation of a riskbased decision making process; and contributions to attaining corporate objectives.
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Rating agencies, industry association groups, consulting firms, and global insurance
brokers have offered statements and commentaries on ERM as well. In the view of Standard &
Poor’s (2008), the agency:
see[s] ERM as an approach to assure the firm is attending to all risks; a set of
expectations among management, shareholders, and the board about which risks the firm
will and will not take; a set of methods for avoiding situations that might result in losses
that would be outside the firm’s tolerance; a method to shift focus from “cost/benefit” to
“risk/reward”; a way to help fulfill a fundamental responsibility of a company’s board
and senior management; a toolkit for trimming excess risks and a system for intelligently
selecting which risks need trimming; and a language for communicating the firm’s efforts
to maintain a manageable risk profile. (Bromiley et al., 2014)
Several meta-analyses of the literature highlight the varying conceptions of ERM. Mikes
and Kaplan (2014) segment ERM studies into selection, performance, and variation categories,
and call for a contingency approach to the practice beyond standardized frameworks. Kraus and
Lehner (2012) review articles in light of the proposition of the relationship between ERM and
value creation. Bromiley et al. (2014) compare and contrast definitions and descriptions from
academic journals and those found in industry. While recognizing the plethora of opinions,
certain themes begin to span the diversity: ERM is an integrated approach (Altuntas, BerryStölzle & Hoyt, 2011; Barton, Shenkir & Walker, 2001; Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash & Yezegel,
2013; Dickenson, 2001; Libenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Power, 2009) and is concerned with the
recognition and treatment of existing and emerging risks (Farrell & Gallagher, 2014; Fraser &
Henry, 2007; Frigo & Anderson, 2011; Gatzert & Martin, 2013; Teach, 2013).
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Complications in the ERM taxonomy are evident in the variations that draw attention to
certain particular aspects of risk management in post-TRM stages. Many of these “XRM”
methodologies tend to point in the direction of ERM. The distinctions may be understood either
as predecessor or alternative names for essentially the same processes (Fraser & Simkins, 2007;
Rao & Marie, 2007), or reflect boundaries redrawn around what are accepted as ERM concepts
to create new typologies for case-specific explicative purposes. Thus, strategic risk management
(Gates & Nantes, 2006; RIMS, 2012; Slywotsky & Drzik, 2005; Verbano & Venturini, 2011),
financial risk management (Verbano & Venturini, 2011), integrated risk management (Colquitt
et al., 1999), risk silo management, holistic ERM, risk-based management, ERM by the numbers
(Mikes, 2009), total risk management (Anderson, 2008; Haimes, 1992), risk and value
management (Mikes, 2005) and business-wide risk management (Rao & Marie, 2007) appear in
the literature alongside of ERM, broadly defined. Other XRM qualifications are particular to
certain industries or risk classifications, which include engineering risk management, supply
chain management risk, clinical risk management and disaster risk management (Verbano &
Venturini, 2011).
II.4 The value proposition
The upside value proposition found in ERM studies also has numerous qualitative and
quantitative conceptions, ranging from general references to detailed, formulaic constructions.
These propositions can be grouped into three classifications: explicit expressions, inferential
references and “risk exploitation-as-value exploration”.
II.4.1 Explicit expressions.
These expressions of the value component derived from ERM implementation include maximum
sustainable value (AIRMIC, 2010; Andersen, 2008), shareholder value (Ballou, Heitger &
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Schultz, 2009; Beasley, Branson & Hancock, 2008; Dickensen, 2001; Farrell & Gallagher, 2014;
Frigo & Anderson, 2012; Gordon et al., 2009; Miller, 1998; Scherzer & Mackay, 1998),
stakeholder value (Ai, Brockett, Cooper & Golden, 2012; Beasley et al., 2006; Fraser & Simkins,
2007; Frigo & Anderson, 2011; Gupta, Prakash & Rangan, 2011); value-at-risk (Ai et al., 2012;
Arena et al., 2011; Mikes, 2009), economic value (Altuntas et al., 2011; Andersen, 2008),
corporate value (Andersen, 2008), future value (Barton et al., 2012) value through cost reduction
(Baxter et al., 2013), firm value (Baxter et al., 2013; Bromiley et al., 2014; Gatzert & Martin,
2013; McShane et al., 2011; Meulbroek, 2002), strategic value (Beasley & Branson, 2010;
Mikes, 2008), perceived value (Beasley et al., 2012), short- and long-term value (CAS, 2003;
Farrell & Gallagher, 2014), economic value added (Diers, 2011), practical value (Gates,
Nicholas & Walker, 2012), Tobin’s Q as a standard proxy for firm value (Hoyt & Libenberg,
2011), synergic value (Kraus & Lehner, 2012) and differential value (Libenberg & Hoyt, 2003).
II.4.2 Inferential references.
In addition to the explicit value-based descriptions are other claims attributed to ERM for upside
benefits. In this classification are risk-reward optimization (Farrell & Gallagher, 2014; Merchant,
2012); risk-informed decision-making (Arena et al., 2011; Gates & Nantes, 2006; Purdy, 2010;
Rao & Marie, 2007; Teach, 2013); improved capital allocation (Aabo et al., 2005; Ai et al., 2012;
Francis & Paladino, 2008; Mikes, 2005; Nocco & Stolz, 2006); reduced cost of capital (Barton et
al., 2012; Hoyt & Libenberg, 2011; Kraus & Lehner, 2012); improved strategic decision making
(Elliott, 2013, p.1.23); involvement in strategic planning (Farrell & Gallagher, 2014; Simkins,
2008; Viscelli, 2013); lower cost of debt (Aabo et al., 2005); the potential for positive impact on
credit ratings (Arena et al., 2010; Fraser & Simkins, 2007) and a proactive response to risk
(RIMS, 2014).
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II.4.3 Risk exploitation-as-value exploration.
I have created a descriptive term for a category of upside, value-based references in the
literature that use the specific term, “exploit”. Such a clarification was necessary to preclude
equivocating the meaning of exploit with that which is recognized in the context of the
ambidexterity literature. For example, Sobel and Reding (2004) link risk exploitation with
pursuing strategic opportunities. Arena et al. (2011) recognize research focused on the
exploitation of synergies between planning processes and ERM. Libenberg and Hoyt (2003)
posit that a benefit of ERM is that it allows firms to exploit the effects of synergy in the risk
management process. Anderson (2008, 2009) argues that total risk management, an ERM analog,
enables firms to exploit upside potential, opportunities, gains and new possibilities in the
execution of business initiatives. McShane et al. (2011) propose that a fundamental concept of
ERM is to exploit risks when comparative information advantage exists. Segal (2011, p. 246)
refers to risk exploitation as a motivation to assume additional risk when firms have competitive
advantage and seek profitable returns.
The beneficial claims of ERM are vast, attributing credit to this management process that
establishes exceedingly high expectations. Before further examining empirically this issue of
value, we first must build a foundational understanding of ERM adoption. Having differentiated
between the basic models of TRM and ERM, we now come to a question of uptake: How does
ERM root itself in the organizational soil?
The navigation process from TRM to ERM is a transition that, for the firm deciding to
embark on the journey, will require a substantial retooling of its risk management apparatus.
Evidence suggests that implementing an ERM program is not costless (Pagach & Warr, 2010b),
demands new skills (Blaskovitch & Taylor, 2011; Burton, 2008; Colquitt et al., 1999; Frigo &
Anderson, 2011; Mikes & Kaplan, 2014; Verbano & Venturini, 2011), is a consequential
28

decision with firm-wide impact (Paape & Speklé, 2012), may include the appointment of a chief
risk officer (CRO), (Aabo et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2011; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Kraus &
Lehner, 2012; Pagach & Warr, 2010a); and the length of time required for adoption is a factor
(HBR Analytical, 2011).
Material differences are apparent in how risk management is effectuated within
organizations before and after the initiation of ERM. ERM represents a progression of risk
management from its risk adverse origins to a state of risk-seeking opportunism and moving
from primarily control processes toward value creating processes (Barton et al., 2001). Having
achieved the transition does not obviate the need to accomplish fundamental TRM tasks, nor
suggest that those core competencies mastered over many years be abandoned (Mikes & Kaplan,
2014; RIMS, 2014). Nonetheless, implementing ERM in environments where TRM has been
embedded creates forces that countervail between past practices and the demands of the future
(He & Wong, 2004). As expressed by an experienced risk professional at a major aerospace
research and development center:
Innovation, looking forward, is absolutely essential, but innovation needs to be balanced
with reflecting backward, learning from experience about what can go wrong. (Mikes &
Kaplan, 2014)
The transition process from TRM to ERM appears to follow a logical, temporal sequence.
First, management makes a decision or series of decisions to explore whether an ERM program
would be an organizational fit. Second, people and process changes occur to shift from the
existing TRM approach to ERM practices. Lastly, organizational embedment gradually occurs
when ERM becomes tested and accepted. As individual organizations introduce and situate ERM
into their environments, differences in the rate of adoption and the depth of integration emerge.
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What is acknowledged to constitute ERM at a point in time may be dissimilar to ERM assessed
at another. Maturity models offer guidance for rationalizing these differences. Building upon the
design work performed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie-Mellon in the
mid-1980s, these models encompass business process management maturity models (BPMM)
(Röglinger, Pöppelbuß & Becker, 2012; Van Looy, De Backer, Poels & Snoeck, 2013;),
capability maturity models (CMM) (Carcary, 2012) and capability maturity model integration
(CMMI) (Shang & Lin, 2009). A common denominator among the models is the evaluation of
the organizational adoption of processes against scalar frameworks that provide comparative data
representing successive degrees of maturity (Van Looy et al., 2013). RIMS has commissioned
the development of a capability maturity model specifically for ERM applications, known as the
RIMS Risk Maturity Model for ERM, or RMM (RIMS ERM). Within its structure, the RMM has
recognized several leading industry frameworks and standards, drawing from COSO:2004, ISO
31000:2009, Solvency II:2009, BS 31100:2011, the FERMA adoption of the United Kingdom
Risk Management Standard of 2002, and the OCEG Red Book–GRC Capability Model™
(Farrell & Gallagher, 2014). Multidimensional benchmarking characterizes the RMM,
supporting an assessment tool based on “attributes” and “drivers”. Results of the RMM are
expressed in progressive “risk maturity scores” ranging from a low of “1 - Ad hoc”, or low
competence; “2 – Initial”; “3 – Repeatable”; “4 – Managed”; to “5 – Leadership”, indicating
excellent competence. The applicability of such models, however, should be weighed against the
still-evolving concept of ERM, and the appropriateness of using broadly conceived external
standards to assess efficacy (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014). Further, we must have a clear
understanding of any industrial process before studying and classifying its maturity (L.
Mathiassen, personal communication, October 24, 2014).
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In summary, an abundance of normative ERM, and ERM analog propositions are
competing for relevance (Blaskovitch & Taylor, 2011; Mikes & Kaplan, 2014). Farrell and
Gallagher (2014) posit that given the complexity of institutional risk profiles and their impact on
organizations, it is not possible to characterize ERM with a small number of attributes. In
contrast, I argue that while ERM is a far-reaching, complicated management process with
multiple extensions defined by a variety of constituent parties, it is in search of a parsimonious
explanation. How then, do we arrive at an informed, fundamental expression of what is ERM?
Bromiley et al. (2014) propose an “emerging consensus” of ERM from the literature.
This consensus is the locus of three linked dimensions, each of which differentiates ERM from
its TRM ancestry. I describe these distinctions as being holistic, horizon and harmonization.
First, the holistic element is achieved as discrete risk boundaries give way to a broader
perspective. Synergistic benefits are predicted to accrue as individual silo-based risks contribute
to a firm-wide risk aggregation (Pagach & Warr, 2010b). Integrative efforts afford the
opportunity to recognize interdependencies, to manage risk correlation across an institutional
portfolio, and to constitute a total risk profile of the organization. Second, horizon refers to risks
beyond the known or traditionally insured, including those of an operational and strategic nature.
As the horizon expands, the tracking of emerging risks arising in the operational theater
coalesces with known risks for which effective management routines are in place. ERM adoption
affords a new perspective and activities focused on anticipating and recognizing these emerging
risks (Elliott, 2013, p. 1.24). Further, the potential impact of new risks, particularly those that are
highly complex and global in nature, create issues of resilience that are well beyond the scope of
TRM (WEF, 2013) and call for adaptive, innovative thinking and solutions. Lastly,
harmonization is the value generating, upside potential of the risk management process
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functioning in tandem with the maintenance of downside control. It represents the incremental
value realized through ERM adoption in excess of that which is attained through TRM or other
existing management control plans. The harmonization dimension of ERM risk resolution, and
the value associated in addition to that is closely linked to the holistic and horizon dimensions.
By engaging in new exploratory activities, a duality of purpose is created for the continued
maintenance of the downside and the quest for the upside. These forces demand from firms a
reassessment of existing capabilities and a reconfiguration of assets that is central to
ambidexterity (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008), and in particular as ambidexterity is viewed
through the lens of dynamic capabilities.
Explicating the nature of each dimension, and the relationships among these three
foundational components of the ERM construct, are key to our understanding of what form or
forms ambidexterity takes in ERM and how ambidexterity is operationalized. For example, when
firms are motivated to pursue ERM, is there an observable sequence of effectuating silo
integration and an expanded risk horizon that enables harmonization? Does one dimension
appear to have more emphasis on behalf of management or greater organizational impact than
the other? Importantly, how are resources configured to achieve holistic, horizon and
harmonization changes as experienced practitioners engage in ERM? While measurements of the
level of correlation, if any, among the dimensions, are beyond the scope of this research, I have
considered the interlacing of these components in the data collection for the study.
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III CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
III.1 Organizational Ambidexterity
When considering the concept of ambidexterity, the most familiar association is that of “using
both hands with equal ease” (Merriam-Webster). In companies, research into this systematic
multitasking capacity is based in organizational design (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Tensions
emanate from the complex task environment of firms, which demands the institutional
wherewithal to follow contradictory paths to adapt and survive over the long term.
Ambidexterity is recognized as the institutional ability to perform two different things, or
paradoxical activities, with equal effectiveness (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013) and to resolve the
tension that arises from executing on those activities. It has found application in describing a
range of dualities that include alignment-adaptability, strong ties-bridging ties, and explorativeexploitative knowledge sharing. However, it is the construct of exploration-exploitation, and
specifically the ability of a firm to do both simultaneously, around which ambidexterity
empirical research appears to have centered (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013).
The pairing of exploitation and exploration as distinct, yet interrelated organizational
learning constructs (March, 1991) has found application in many areas of research, including
technological innovation (He & Wong, 2004), new product development (Holmqvist, 2004;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), process management (Benner and Tushman, 2003) and strategic
management (Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Duncan (1976), in recognizing previous studies on the
tradeoff between flexibility and administration (Thompson, 1967), first used the term
“organizational ambidexterity” to describe the demand for firms to consider structural shifting in
order to originate and to pursue innovation. March (1991) described the core adaptive challenge
to firms as the requirement to continue to exploit extant assets and to also explore new
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capabilities to guard against market and technological changes. Exploitation is demonstrated by
activities which reflect refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation and
execution (March, 1991), productivity improvements and cost reductions (Benner & Tushman,
2003), “the use and development of things already known” (Levinthal & March, 1993),
implementation (He & Wong, 2004), alignment (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004), processes by
which organizations create focused attention (Levinthal & March, 1993), convergent thinking
(Smith & Tushman, 2005) and control, certainty and variance reduction (O’Reilly & Tushman,
2008). In contrast, exploration is evidenced by activities which reflect search, variation, risk
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and innovation (Benner & Tushman, 2003;
He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991), invention and building new capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds,
2004), “the pursuit of knowledge, of things that might come to be known (Levinthal & March,
1993), divergent thinking (Smith & Tushman, 2005), adaptability (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004),
processes by which organizations create variety in experience through experimentation, trialing
and free association (Marengo, 1993), and autonomy and embracing variation (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008).
The routines, processes, skills required for exploration different than those for
exploitation. Consequently, the differences between exploitation and exploration activities create
opposing forces that produce tension in firms (He & Wong, 2004). They compete for short
supplies of time, talent and treasure that can result in difficult allocation decisions. The manner
in which the forces are reconciled is unclear in the literature. Birkinshaw & Gupta (2013)
envision an ambidexterity efficiency frontier to clarify the operationalization choices facing
organizations to manage the interaction of exploitation and exploration. There are potential perils
in overemphasizing one course over the other. Mono-directional exploration and exploitation
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activities can become the root cause of negative results, including failure traps, success traps
(Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006) and competency traps, core rigidities and myopic vision (He &
Wong, 2004). Since the resolution of the exploitation-exploration conflict weighs heavily on the
success and perpetuation of the firm, achieving a resolution of the two is a priority of the highest
order (March, 1991). The work of optimizing this interplay between exploitation and
exploration, of performing both simultaneously, characterizes the ambidextrous organization
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007).
In a review of the ambidexterity literature, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) propose a
comprehensive framework that describes the relationships among the antecedents, outcomes and
moderators identified in the ambidexterity literature streams. Their model posits three
organizational antecedents of structure, context and leadership, which are effectuated through
organizational learning, technological innovation, organizational adaptation, strategic
management or organizational design and lead to accounting, market or growth outcomes.
Moderating variables in this relationship include environmental dynamics, competitive
dynamics, market orientation, resource endowment and firm scope. Simsek, Heavey, Velga and
Souder (2009) develop a typology of ambidexterity focused on temporal and structural
dimensions, the combination of which manifests in four types: harmonic, partitional, cyclical and
reciprocal ambidexterity.
Firms, then, in a variety of ways can pursue ambidexterity. The literature seems to focus
principally on describing ambidexterity occurring as a migration over time or sequential
ambidexterity; through alignment of people, processes and culture or structural ambidexterity;
by behavioral means or contextual ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013); or as a function
of senior leadership (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).
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III.1.1 Sequential.
In the sequential view of ambidexterity, firms adjust their structures to respond to changes in
environmental conditions, often over extended periods of time (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013).
Early studies described punctuated equilibrium (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994) as a sequential
process of adaptation. Later research has identified temporal shifting using “rhythmic switching”
between exploitation and exploration (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) as a proposed source of
sequential ambidexterity.
III.1.2 Structural.
Ambidexterity that is considered structural emanates from a bifurcated organizational
architecture, where different work units are centered on alignment of the business, and others on
adaptation to changes in the environment (Duncan, 1976; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).
Numerous conceptualizations of structural separation have been proposed, including spatial
separation at either the corporate or business unit level to engage in exploration or exploration
(Duncan, 1976); numerous tightly coupled subunits that are loosely coupled with one another
(Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008); parallel structures, which enable switching between different
structures (Bushe & Shani, 1991); and primary/secondary structures to balance routine and nonroutine tasks (Goldstein, 1985).
III.1.3 Contextual.
A different way in which ambidexterity is proposed does not depend on structural means, but is
instead behaviorally based. Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) define contextual ambidexterity as
“the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability across an
entire business unit” (p. 209). It is grounded in the allowance of individual determination of the
time and effort allocated toward both alignment and adaptability within business units, facilitated
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by stretch, discipline, support and trust (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Ghoshal & Bartlett (1994)
associate context with the beliefs, processes and systems that guide the behaviors of individuals
in the organization.
III.1.4 Leadership.
Involvement of senior leaders in promoting ambidexterity, and their importance in the process, is
acknowledged in several studies of structural and contextual ambidexterity (Tushman &
O’Reilly, 1996; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). However, other researchers (Lubatkin, Simsek,
Ling & Veiga, 2006) identify leadership contributions separately as an antecedent of
organizational ambidexterity (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).
O’Reilly and Tushman (2013) also refer to the possibility of combinations of the
structural and contextual forms over time in a switching cadence, which I refer to as hybridized
ambidexterity. Birkinshaw and Gupta (2013) suggest that a significant corollary for
ambidexterity research is the perspective of ambidexterity as a nested property, occurring at
different organizational levels concurrently. Additionally, the authors point to the lack of
operationalization clarity in ambidexterity studies, and whether exploitation and exploration
“should be balanced, traded off against one another, reconciled or simply managed.”
III.2 Dynamic Capabilities
Sustaining organizational survival in the face of changing environmental conditions is a crucial
challenge, to which extensive conceptual and empirical research has been committed from a
wide span of academia. In the development of diverse theories to address the challenges arise
two fundamental questions (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008): Are organizations able to adapt to
shifting conditions and indeed change? If so, how then is this adaptation accomplished? From the
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perspective of strategic choice has emerged the view of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano &
Shuen, 1997), which is a management response to maintaining long-term competitive advantage.
Extending the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1986, 1991), the seminal work of
Teece et al. (1997) define dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build and
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments.”
Dynamic capabilities are differentiated from those that are static, existing or ordinary. In the
resource-based view of the firm, capabilities are defined as “a firm’s capacity to deploy
resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end” (Amit
& Schoemaker, 1993). These existing capabilities, also referred to as core competencies
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008) operational capabilities (Zollo & Winter, 2002) or zero-level
capabilities (Winter, 2003), are tactical level routines, structures, processes, skills and systems
that enable the firm to compete in its contemporaneous environment (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
While essential for operational continuity, such core competencies do not position the firm to
respond to change and to engage in new challenges (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).
In contrast, dynamic capabilities are exemplified by organizational structures, processes
and skill sets that equip firms to detect changes in the environment, define opportunities and
configure in new ways (Teece, 2007). Dynamic capabilities are processes or routines conducted
at a high organizational level (Winter, 2003; Zott, 2003) and are ways of learning new routines
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). These changes are brought about through the actions of strategic
leadership (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Teece, Pisano & Shuen,
1997) in reconfiguring the firm to address changing environmental conditions. Central to the
importance of dynamic capabilities is the capacity of senior managers to seize opportunities,
reconfigure the organization, and neutralize path dependencies (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).
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Teece (2007) identifies a triad construct of dynamic capabilities that are of central
importance in enabling firms to become ambidextrous: sensing, seizing and reconfiguring. First,
sensing capabilities to discern opportunities and threats in the environment demands resources,
routines and communication directed at searching, scanning, and exploration. Second, seizing are
the timely management actions subsequent to sensing that involve decision-making and
execution. Lastly, reconfiguration, or “asset orchestration” (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008) is the
commitment by senior leaders to design and implement structures and systems that shift
organizational structures to capture new value.
III.2.1 Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability.
O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) extend both the ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities research
streams by integrating the two concepts. They propose that the ability of senior leaders to adapt
and reconfigure assets to overcome path dependencies, a dynamic capability, is central to the
enablement of a firm to both explore and exploit simultaneously, that is, to be ambidextrous. In
so doing, the authors ingrain the concept of ambidexterity into the dynamic capabilities
framework. Jansen et al. (2009) conceptualize organizational ambidexterity as a dynamic
capability, proposing that this linkage “refers to the routines and processes by which
ambidextrous organizations mobilize, coordinate, and integrate dispersed contradictory efforts,
and allocate, reallocate, combine and recombine resources and assets across differentiated
exploratory and exploitative units” (p. 797). Their argument is founded upon structural
differentiation, extending the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) on specialized organizational
subsystems.
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III.2.2 ERM as a dynamic capability.
Nair et al. (2013) propose that for firms engaged in crisis environments, ERM itself constitutes a
dynamic capability. The instant study is the first to associate the processes and activities of ERM
with the conceptualization of dynamic capabilities, by referring to a series of similarities between
the nature of and characteristics shared by both. For example, the sensing and scanning activities
of dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007) are analogous to the scanning for emerging risks in
horizon dimension of ERM, as is consideration of the upside and downside risks found in
harmonization. The authors present several hypotheses to test whether a sample of publicly
traded insurance industry organizations that possess superior ERM capabilities, as indicated by
S&P ERM ratings, perform better during and after crisis situations than organizations with
inferior capacities. Mixed or partial support for the hypotheses based on measures of swings in
share price and profitability were indicated in the results. However, in proposing a tentative link
between ERM and dynamic capabilities, the study has created an avenue for further explication
of the relationship, which is incorporated into this research.
In the final section of the literature review, I examine two sources of secondary data for
evidence of ambidexterity in ERM: risk management surveys conducted by companies having
practitioner interest in ERM, and case studies published in academic journals.
III.2.3 Evidence of ambidexterity.
Risk management practitioner surveys. A data source receiving little attention from academic
ERM researchers is that which is produced with a fair amount of regularity in the practitioner
domain. Through the use of periodic surveys, the practitioner community examines the state of
the post-TRM function, ERM specifically and topics closely related to ERM. For example, in
one of few studies identified that draw directly upon this secondary data, Cooper, Fazeruk and

40

Khan (2013) attempt to measure the perceived relationship between organizational culture and
ERM by developing testable hypotheses from the aggregation of certain questions posed in a
group of practitioner studies. Risk management professionals, C-suite officers and business
executives in a variety of sectors are contacted for their views and opinions on various risk
management issues, both specific to their organizations and to the industry in general.
Consultants, association groups, global insurance brokers, and insurance carriers conduct the
studies for an assortment of purposes. Business development, brand enhancement, client
retention, and demonstration of thought leadership are among the motivating factors behind this
consumer-oriented research. The level of rigor to which the conduct of these surveys is held is
not always determinable, since the intended audience has not historically insisted upon a
minimum set of standards for ERM research methods, data collection and analysis. Nonetheless,
these data uncover useful perspectives into the actual operation of ERM in firms, and as such,
some of their findings are considered to inform this research.
I identified fourteen surveys (Appendix A) published over a five-year period from 2008 –
2013, which can be segmented into five categories of origination: global insurance brokers,
insurance carriers, industry associations, consulting firms and industry periodicals. Sample sizes
in the surveys range from approximately 100 to 1,400 respondents, representing both financial
and non-financial companies. Commitments to the practice of ERM spanned the motivation,
advancement and assimilation phases. Not all of the projects were sole-source research, as
evidenced by numerous collaborative efforts among organizations. Some of the surveys were
produced one-time only, and others, such as those authored by PwC and RIMS, are repeated at
regular intervals. While the question sets differ from instrument to instrument based on the data
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collection aspirations of the sponsors, several of the surveys probe into areas that this study
addresses and provide additional perspective on ERM adoption.
For instance, one of the main findings from the KPMG International Global Risk Survey
is that a lack of capabilities is the primary barrier to risk integration in companies. 42 percent of
the survey respondents cited this gap, ahead of the 36 percent of respondents that rated process
complexity as the major obstacle. This finding may be evidence, at least within the KPMG
population, of the relative importance of resource reconfiguration as companies attempt to
transition to ERM. Further, these two findings taken together may illustrate how the alignment
of capabilities and process through contextual ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004)
should operate, or in this case, fails to do so, in the risk management domain. This challenge to
achieving ambidexterity is reinforced by the 35 percent of the respondents to the 2011 Harvard
Business Review survey that cited the “failure of key staff to acquire new skills or accept new
roles”, and the 40 percent of participants in the Forbes Insights survey that expressed the need to
“revamp the in-house risk management team.” Accenture, in its 2013 Global Risk Management
Study, found a 20-percentage point gap between the current disposition of its respondents’ risk
capabilities and a desired level of high development. Competency gaps regarding the efficacy of
risk management structure and processes were also uncovered in the PwC Risk in Review
Survey samples during 2013 and 2014. In the words of one executive respondent in the PwC
study, “we need to have the right army to fight the next war–not the last one”, elucidating the
expanded horizon sought in the adoption of ERM.
Respondents to the Marsh 2013 Excellence in Risk Management study pointed toward
training and education and strengthening ERM capabilities as top priorities, but left open the
issue of how to achieve these goals. In contrast to the overall themes of this collection of
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findings, the 2013 Lloyds Risk Index results compared to the London-based insurance market’s
previous survey in 2011 indicates a positive trend in risk management resource reconfiguration
in certain geographic regions, accomplished primarily through additional training and the filling
in of talent gaps.
Deloitte, in its Global Risk Management Survey, Eighth Edition, presents historical data
on the ERM adoption rates of participants in the company’s surveys from 2006, 2008, 2010 and
2012. The consultant segregates their respondents into three categories of “yes, program in
place”, “yes, currently implementing one” and “no, but plan to create one”, which corresponds to
the simplified assimilation – advancement – motivation model developed for this study. Of the
respondents to their 2012 survey, 46% indicated expansions of their ERM programs through
increases in headcount, which may indicate evidence of structural ambidexterity being exercised.
The Accenture 2013 Global Risk Management Study poses its question of whether the
respondents’ organization have adopted ERM in a slightly different fashion, with choices of
“yes”, “no, but we are planning to implement one in the next 1 – 2 years” or “no, but it is in
discussion”. In comparison to the Deloitte research, these answers are somewhat more finegrained in the motivation phase, but less so in drawing a distinction between the ERM
advancement and assimilation phases. Conversely, a decline in the number of firms with formal
risk management functions declined during according to the 2012 Aon Global Risk Management
Survey (2012), but this finding may be explained by demographic changes in the survey sample.
The 2012 Milliman Risk Institute Survey discusses the structural linkage of risk
management to other parts of the organization. This survey indicates a strong association of
ERM to risk-transfer strategies, which I earlier identified as a potential mechanism to enable a
post-TRM state. While no interpretation is offered, this finding may indicate a resource
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reconfiguration more reflective of contextual ambidexterity than structural in the sample. The
2013 Association for Financial Professionals Risk Survey incorporates a section on “Risk
Management Structure and Culture, with a question regarding the extent of centralization or
decentralization of the risk management function. Their findings indicate that 60 percent of the
companies surveyed favor centralized risk management processes with decentralized execution.
Such a response may indicate the execution of structural changes to control or monitor the
processes through new organizational subunits.
Lastly, RIMS has conducted and published ERM surveys in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013.
Of the questions posed in the 2013 survey, two, in particular, provide insight into how
ambidexterity is operationalized in the sample population. First, to the question of which
functional department is primarily responsible for managing ERM activities, 56 percent
answered that the [traditional] risk management department takes the lead role. This finding may
be indicative of widespread contextual ambidexterity among the respondents, whereby the
existing TRM resources are reconfiguring to maintain downside control as well as direct upside
value delivery. Second, when asked to comment on the value gained through ERM, 78 percent of
the respondents chose factors other than the avoidance and/or mitigation of risk, which is the
domain of TRM. This incremental upside potential that is apparently being directed by the TRM
departments includes, among other value determinants, increased risk awareness and the
elimination of risk silos. We should note that RIMS’ targeted population for the survey is its
membership base, that is, traditional risk managers, insurance buyers, and other risk
professionals. It does not necessarily include dedicated ERM practitioners such as chief risk
officers, who may have different perspectives on resource configuration and value.
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Evidence of ambidexterity: ERM case studies. One of the more underrepresented research
areas in the ERM literature is that of non-financial institution case studies that provide rich detail
focused on the management effects of adopting and implementing the practice. While
practitioner surveys document the interest and active engagement in ERM on the part of industry
segments beyond insurers and banks, these non-financial firms have garnered less interest from
researchers (Arena et al., 2010). Nonetheless, several studies have been conducted which offer
some useful insights for the purposes of this research.
Two of the earliest non-financial industry risk management case studies were carried out
by Tufano (1996) on the North American gold mining industry, and Harrington, Niehaus and
Risko (2002), who explored United Grain Growers (UGG) in Canada. In both cases, the research
was primarily oriented toward the application of ERM as a financial solution mechanism, either
by hedging gold prices in the mining industry or by managing weather risk at UGG. Subsequent
to these studies was the research into Hydro One (Aabo et al., 2005), the largest electricity
transmission and distribution utility in Canada. The authors, one of whom became the chief risk
officer (CRO) of the firm (Fraser), present a detailed review of the impact of ERM adoption and
implementation. Hydro One is an important example of an organization progressing through the
three phases of the transition model developed for this research. The firm was motivated
internally by a desire to become a best-practices led company, and externally by the deregulation
of the Canadian electricity markets. The motivation process continued through a pilot feasibility
study to determine whether or not to move forward. Hydro One, as a consequence of the choice
to implement ERM, evidences structural ambidexterity in reconfiguring its resources to establish
the CRO position, and to institute a new corporate risk management group. The company
continued its advancement in ERM from 1999 – 2005 with increasing sophistication exercised in

45

its risk treatment applications, and the detailed enumeration of expected upside benefits that were
included in the company’s 2003 annual report. At the date of publication of the Hydro One
article, the firm had substantially achieved a high level of ERM assimilation:
Finally, we note that ERM has become such an integral part of the workplace that the
corporate Chief Risk Officer is now becoming a low-maintenance position (the evolution
of the CRO) within the company.
Although the Hydro One case is comparatively richer in detail regarding the management
effects of ERM adoption than the earlier studies, there still exists a gap in the before-and-after
narration of how the then-existing TRM function was structured and deployed in the company.
This additional slice of knowledge would enable us to articulate better the working and
operationalization of ambidexterity, particularly as the firm progressed through its advancement
and assimilation phases.
Arena et al. (2010) examined the organizational dynamics of ERM at three Italian firms
representing the telecommunication services, petrochemical and automation and information
industries in a longitudinal study. As a part of the empirical evidence developed, the authors
provide detailed narrations of “pre-existing practices and ERM assembling.” This evolving
overlap of new and established management control processes, described as a “mutual
entanglement”, highlights the potential institutional messiness that occurs as resources are
reconfigured toward the goal of achieving ERM ambidexterity. The attitudes toward ERM
adoption were different in each case study and offer important descriptions of how exploitation
and exploration began to coexist at these firms through attempted changes in people and
processes. The ultimate extent of ERM advancement was not uniform across the sample. In one
of the cases, structural ambidexterity is evident in the separation between the company’s TRM-
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oriented management control unit (MCU) and the newly imposed conduct of ERM. In the words
of the MCU head:
ERM? What is ERM? …it is indeed crucial to be compliant with these rules now,…but
their work [ERM] is totally separate from ours and does not enter into the budgeting.
In contrast, another of the cases reveals openness to exploring ERM through sequential
ambidexterity, as articulated by the firm’s controller:
This is my dream: one day I’d like to be able to read back from every actual event and
see that our CRO was able to provide me with the data for detecting it. We are rowing in
the same direction.
Having established the literature foundations for risk management in the traditional and
enterprise modes, and for ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities, we now turn to the theoretical
framework that supports the approach to the data collection and analysis to which this research is
directed.
III.3 Analytical Framing
III.3.1

Process of ERM adoption.

From the literature review I have identified an emerging consensus of ERM (Bromiley et al.,
2014) that instills clarity in a complex research domain, and conceptualizes a standard form of
ERM against which the companies in the sample may be compared. Thus, the holistic, horizon
and harmonization dimensions of the model specify the factors necessary and sufficient to
differentiate the ERM model from the TRM mode.
Given an informed definition of what ERM is, a process orientation in this research is
needed in order to explicate how the changes in configuration occurred in the sample to achieve
the resultant ERM dimensions, focused on firms that have achieved reputations of being highly
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experienced practitioners. The RIMS RMM maturity levels are useful for delineating certain
stepwise end-state characteristics of ERM implementation. However, for the purpose of this
study I have adapted the RMM as presented by Farrell and Gallagher (2014), drawing upon both
the literature and experiential knowledge to render this interpretation. The five RMM maturity
score levels have been grouped into a simplified framework to form a sequential model of ERM
adoption occurring in three successive phases: motivation, advancement and assimilation.
Motivation encompasses the first two levels, Ad hoc, and Initial, of the RMM. This phase
captures the initial decision-making considerations preceding ERM adoption and offers insight
into the question of why to engage in what may be a significant change management effort. It
corresponds to the “ERM Program Drivers” section of the 2013 RIMS Enterprise Risk
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Table 1 ERM: Progression toward organizational assimilation

RIMS RMM
maturity level

Primary
competency

Organizational
capacity

Motivation

Core competency

Downside

TRM

Motivation

Core competency

Downside

TRM – ERM

Advancement

Core competency

Downside, and
upside emerging

Dynamic
capability
developing

Dominant
approach

Transition
phase

1 - Ad hoc

TRM

2 – Initial

3 - Repeatable

4 - Managed

ERM

Advancement

5 - Leadership

ERM

Assimilation

Dynamic
capability

Ambidexterity

Ambidexterity

Management Survey. Motivation in this research is indicative of a pre-decision state in which the
fit and purpose of ERM is under active consideration, but management commitment to move
forward has not yet been made. At this stage of evaluation, a due diligence effort of some nature
will commence, and external consultants may be engaged to conduct feasibility studies. The
demands, intentions, expectations, and emphases brought to bear on the ERM go- or no-go
decision may have important downstream ramifications (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014). These factors
will influence how resources are initially configured to address the downside-upside duality, and
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may illustrate how endogeneity enters into the adoption process. Major events (Paté-Cornell,
2012; Weitzner & Darroch, 2010), boards of directors (Desender, 2007), audit committees
(Burton, 2008), senior management (Meulbroek, 2002), in-position risk managers (RIMS, 2013),
regulatory bodies (Gupta et al., 2011), rating agency requirements (RIMS, 2013), directors’ and
officers’ concerns about liability (Viscelli, 2013), poor company performance (Arena et al.,
2010), industry-specific considerations (Tufano, 1996), owners or investors (RIMS 2013), banks
or creditors (RIMS, 2013) and the desire to identify emerging risks (Viscelli, 2013) are among
the internal and external forces that can impact firm motivation toward ERM. External advisors
may also play a leading role in whether or how the firm moves forward, but the ultimate benefit
of such involvements on ERM effectiveness have been questioned (Aabo et al., 2005). Time and
cost investments are likely for exploratory purposes only at this juncture. It may take months or
even years for management to study the possibility of embracing ERM and decide on a particular
course of action. Thus, expenses incurred would be for obtaining information and advice, rather
than be reflective of changes in organizational design. For firms in the motivation phase, we
anticipate the downside TRM configuration to be exclusive or dominant, albeit combined with an
initial outlook on future expectations of upside potential and how the firm plans to achieve such
positive outcomes.
The advancement phase aligns with level 3, Repeatable and level 4, Managed, of the
RMM. This phase would commence subsequent to an affirmative decision to move forward, as
the organization begins to change, and the breadth of the commitment to ERM takes shape.
Communication of the decision through internal and external channels to document the firm’s
intentions will become a consideration. Management execution of the plan to implement ERM,
whether by the imposition of a recognized industry framework or some other means, begins.
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Time spent in the advancement phase will vary considerably, as the firm adjusts to the
implementation of new risk management protocols. In determining a temporal standard for when
advancement ends and assimilation begins, we should allow for sufficient time for advancement
to enable adequate institutional stress testing of the commitment to change. This stipulation
would ensure that, apart from management intentions to proceed, the ERM adoption plan has
been subjected to established strategy and budget challenges that regularly occur across the
business. Additional costs may become a more significant factor in the advancement phase as
resources are reconfigured, and skill gaps are uncovered. Examples of incremental expense
categories include the continued use of consultants, internal training, additions to staff and new
information systems to collect, monitor and measure ERM related-data. The pace and nature of
the adoption and the extent of the implementation process over time in advancement should
begin to reveal how downside exploitation and upside exploration are coexisting. In the
advancement phase, we would expect to observe with increased clarity how ambidexterity is
being expressed. Changes evident in the reconfiguration will also provide clues as to how
ambidexterity is being operationalized, and whether the downside and upside are being
“…balanced, traded off against one another, reconciled or simply managed” (Birkinshaw &
Gupta, 2013). An additional consideration is if ERM ambidexterity is becoming distinguishable
as a dynamic capability, apart from the core competencies developed in TRM.
Lastly, assimilation represents a depth of embedment of ERM in what the RMM would
characterize as a fully mature, level 5 Leadership RMM state. During this final phase, ERM has
become vital to the way business is done in the firm. It is evidenced by significant changes in
process and behaviors in the subject organization, with a downside-upside duality and resource
deployment that differ from that found in the motivation and advancement phases. Firms
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reaching the assimilation phase of ERM after many years will likely evidence significant
changes in the conduct of their overall management processes. ERM at this juncture will have
progressed to a position that directly impacts organizational strategy, planning and decisionmaking, performance measurements and governance. The discrete functional identity from which
ERM was initiated may have given way to an effective operational absorption, where its
independence as a program is less meaningful than the influence it exerts across the organization.
Recognition of this level of embedment of ERM should be well documented internally, and
further confirmed in the public domain. When the ERM maturity level increases and
organizational assimilation of the process deepens, the stability and permanency of the
configuration become considerations. At this point, different motivations may arise, perhaps
newly emerging risks or other internal or external influences, which cause the firm to consider a
subsequent reconfiguration cycle.
Table 1 illustrates the various relationships among RMM levels and the corresponding
TRM or ERM approach, the transition phase, the nature of competency reflected in the phase,
and whether exploitation or ambidexterity is expressed. Within each of the transition phases exist
a deployment of assets that reflects the currency of management thinking toward its risk
management approach. The focus of the data collection effort for this study is on the assimilation
phase, and how the experienced firms in the sample have configured their resources over time to
address the downside-upside duality.
III.3.2 Summary of framing.
Summarizing the theoretical framing, the practice of risk management in firms can be viewed as
an evolving process in which choices may be made to pursue a higher level of sophistication
from engaging in risk management activities, and to enable a broader range of organizational
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influence from those activities and to capture additional resultant value. As a consequence of
building core competencies in the traditional mode of managing risk (TRM), firms become adept
at commercial insurance purchasing and minimizing downside loss exposures, with little to no
interactivity linking risk management efforts either cross functionally or to other, higher-level
management control processes. In contrast, contemporary conceptualizations of risk management
are founded on an enterprise-wide (ERM) view of the firm. This concept is effectuated through a
phased process that validates the initial motivation to change risk management modes, advances
the changes throughout the organization, and eventually assimilates ERM into the inner
workings of the firm with increasing durability. While the construct of ERM is not uniform in
theory or practice, a set of dimensions has been identified that posits necessary and sufficient
conditions for qualifying risk management activities as ERM. First, a holistic dimension must
overcome the tensions and path dependencies extant in non-integrated organizational silos.
Second, the risk horizon dimension enlarges the scope of management attention to address both
emerging and existing risks. Lastly, risk averse, control and mitigation measures become
harmonized with risk seeking, value additive activities. Viewed through a theoretical lens of
ambidexterity, this downside-upside duality is a proxy for exploitation-exploration. Firms
committing to a path of ERM adoption must preserve core competencies while developing new
skills. Further, the reconfiguration of resources, assets, and processes to achieve ambidexterity
differs from the maintenance of core competencies and is proposed as a dynamic capability.
Becoming ambidextrous in managing risk through the dynamic capability that emerges is central
to the long-term value expected of ERM. Those firms that are able to optimize the interplay of
exploitation and exploration are better able to sense, seize and reconfigure within their
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organizations to respond to changing risk environments, and lessen the impact of path
dependencies generated by its core competencies in TRM.
The following chapter commences my empirical research journey into finding evidence
of how firms achieve ERM ambidexterity to address the downside and upside of risk.
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IV CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH METHODS
This study examines the question: How do firms reconfigure assets, resources and capabilities in
the process of ERM operationalization to consider both the downside and upside of risk? In the
course of the research, I have endeavored to understand the context within which experienced
risk management professionals make choices, take actions and guide processes. This approach
aligns with the selection of a qualitative methodology for the study (Myers, 2009, pp. 5-6).
Further, in addressing the “how” question, the research is designed as a process analysis. As
described by Van de Ven (2007, pp. 196-197), process studies are primarily focused on
progressions, that is, the nature, sequence and order of events that take place in organizations.
Thus the primary concern of this study is on the meaning of process as a developmental sequence
and not as a category of concepts related to variables, antecedents or consequences of change
(Van de Ven, pp. 197-199).
IV.1 Case Study Design
The method of this research is a qualitative, interpretive case study at the firm level of analysis.
Qualitative studies are directed toward gaining rich insight into the details of the phenomenon of
interest through the collection of data in the form of meanings and descriptions, framed by the
contextual setting of the phenomenon (Simon, 2011). Researchers have utilized qualitative
methods to explore the complexities of ERM (Aabo et al,, 2005; Arena et al., 2011; Mikes, 2011;
Viscelli, 2013), developing empirical data about how it is operationalized in different
organizational settings and environments. Studies conducted in this manner provide a deeper
understanding of the adoption, implementation, and maturation of ERM and offer findings that
may be used to inform quantitative research seeking to explain relationships among ERM-related
variables.
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Participating in this study were eight individuals representing four different
organizations, two from each firm. The ideal candidate profile was a senior risk professional with
personal experience of their organization’s journey from TRM to ERM, as well as having
ongoing operational responsibilities for ERM. Titles of the proposed subjects included risk
manager, enterprise risk manager, director of risk management or enterprise risk management,
vice president or senior vice president of risk management or enterprise risk management, chief
risk officer, treasurer or chief financial officer. I was successful in recruiting individuals who fit
these criteria through my professional network.
Each subject possessed direct experience with ERM adoption at his/her respective firm
and was in a position to offer observations across the motivation, advancement and assimilation
phases. This approach served as an alternative to conducting longitudinal case studies in the
field, which was not possible given time constraints. As such, the data collected was real-time for
questions probing the current state of ERM and retrospective for the earlier phases of the
progression. Both of these sources of qualitative data have potential advantages and
disadvantages. Real-time observations may be less likely to reflect biases and filtering that may
influence memories, but will not have the benefit of the full revelation of how events ultimately
develop. Conversely, the retrospective observations may reflect more thoughtful interpretations
of the unfolding progression, but lack the richer, in-the-moment detail that fades over time.
While the recollections of the paired subjects did not reveal material conflicts, biases in their
perspectives were expected given the differences in background and responsibilities.
Parameterization of the research sample was guided by multiple criteria (Simon, 2011).
First, each firm was among the earliest wave of companies to explore ERM, and subsequently
made a multiyear, commitment to the conduct of a formal ERM program. These commitments
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have been confirmed externally, through disclosure statements or in other documents available in
the public domain. As such, they have progressed through the motivation and advancement
stages and have assimilated ERM into the fabric of the organization. Second, the sample
represents the non-financial sector, which includes manufacturing, retail, service organizations
and higher education. These industry segments have been less heavily researched than financial
institutions, and in particular banks and insurance companies, which have historically been more
extensive adopters of ERM (Beasely et al., 2005). Third, the conduct of ERM in the financial
institution sector emphasizes sophisticated quantitative techniques in the management of income
statement and balance sheet exposures, which Mikes (2009) interprets as a “calculative culture”.
Such practices can be found outside of financial institutions, but they are nonetheless more
focused on the risk quantifications, e.g., “e-R-m”, which are outside of the scope of this study.
Fourth, public companies were chosen to afford access to additional background data and
regulatory disclosures. The university, while not a shareholder-owned organization, nonetheless
meets the standard of financial disclosure. Fifth, each firm in the sample has a history of a
sophisticated approach to TRM, which provides a consistent baseline for comparisons of
structural and contextual change. Lastly, to control for variations based purely on organizational
size, large institutions were selected for the sample. The public companies are all classified as
S&P 500 firms, and the university has an annual operating budget that would otherwise qualify it
for an S&P 500 categorization. Effects that may have originated from differences based on solely
on industry sector if any, were probed through the interview questioning targeted at the
motivation phase. To preserve confidentiality, I have used four pseudonyms place of the actual
names of the organizations: PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo.
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The first organization, PrimoU, is a leading teaching and research institution and health
care system. As of its 2014 financial statements, PrimoU reported annual operating revenues in
excess of $2 billion and total assets of over $8 billion. Student enrollment totaled approximately
15,000, with nearly 30,000 employees. I interviewed the chief risk officer and SVP and general
counsel, both of whom have responsibility across the breadth of the university.
The second organization, SecondoCo, is an electric utility holding company (EUHC),
classified under SIC code 49 – electric, gas and sanitary services. SecondoCo was founded over
60 years ago, and owns generation, transmission and distribution facilities in four states, and is
admitted to do business in an additional four states. As of fiscal year end 2013, annual total
operating revenues exceeded $14 billion, total assets $9 billion and employee headcount 20,000.
The interviewees for this case were the manager, enterprise risk and the director, risk
management, both of whom have responsibility across the entire footprint of the organization.
Additionally, a published interview appearing in a peer-reviewed journal with the director of
enterprise risk has been incorporated as secondary data.
The third organization, TerzoCo, is a U.S. based, package delivery and logistical services
provider classified under SIC code 42 – motor freight transportation and warehousing. TerzoCo
was founded over 100 years ago and operates in over 200 countries through nine primary
business segments. As of fiscal year end 2013, annual total operating revenues exceeded US$45
billion, total assets US$30 billion and employee headcount 300,000. My interviews took place
with the corporate ERM manager and the senior director, risk management, both of whom have
oversight globally.
The fourth organization, QuartoCo, is a U.S. based manufacturer classified under SIC
code 20 – food and kindred products. Founded over 100 years ago, QuartoCo markets its
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products using multiple consumer brands and manages sales through an owned global
distribution network. The company is organized primarily into geographic operating segments.
As of fiscal year end 2013, annual total operating revenues exceeded US$40 billion, total assets
US$75 billion and total employee headcount 110,000. I conducted interviews with the director,
enterprise risk management and the director, risk management, both of whom have global
responsibilities for their functional areas.
To improve the validity of the study by means of triangulation (Yin, 1994), I gathered
data from multiple sources: annual reports and 10-K documents of each firm in the sample,
reviews of websites, and internet searches for publications and statements regarding ERM.
Additionally, archival data was made available from each institution, much of which is not
available publicly, bringing increased clarity and richness to the data analysis process. Such data
included organizational charts, white papers, and management presentations.
IV.2 Data Collection and Analysis
All of the interviews were conducted during the months of January and February 2015. Of the
eight subjects interviewed, seven were done in person at the interviewees’ primary business
location, and one took place via phone. Six interviews were done on a one-to-one basis. One of
the institutions requested that I meet with both risk professionals together, which was
accommodated. The seven interview sessions lasted a total of 8 hr 38 min resulting in a mean
interview length of 1 hr 20 min. Six of the interviewees agreed to be audio recorded, and each
digital file was transcribed by a professional transcription service. Two subjects declined to be
recorded in advance of the scheduled interview due to legal restrictions, and hand-written notes
captured the conversations during those sessions. Direct quotations made by the subjects were
specifically marked as such to increase the accuracy of the data captured. A total of 114 pages of
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text was produced from the transcribed files and field notes. Each of the interviewees provided a
properly signed informed consent form. Confidentiality of the subjects and their organizations
has been maintained per IRB guidelines.
Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews, using a protocol of predetermined questions to direct the flow of the sessions (Appendix B). However, I was flexible in
allowing subjects to expound on areas of their ERM experiences that were particularly
meaningful to them. In so doing, I was able to uncover data that added richness to my
understanding of how and why resources came to be configured. During the interviews, subjects
were encouraged to share their historical insights, present observations, and to reflect in a beforeand-after manner about the differences that ERM has made. This comparative perspective was
important to capture, as it brings clarity to the demarcation between existing TRM downside and
new ERM upside. While the focus of this study is on large organizations in a contemporaneous
setting, the questions also probed into their early phase transitions from TRM to ERM in order to
understand the specific factors that helped shape these firms’ current ERM resource
configurations.
Miles & Huberman (2014) offer a systematic process for analyzing qualitative data,
which I followed in this study. The process incorporates three synchronous work streams: data
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification. Data reduction is the sorting,
sharpening and summarizing of the collected inputs to facilitate understanding and analysis. Data
displays are graphical formats, matrices and various types of charts and tables that illustrate and
make readily accessible organized information. Conclusion drawing and verification is the
process of drawing out of observations, explanations and propositions contained in the data.
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While common in qualitative, interpretive studies (Cousins & Robey, 2005), singleperson coding may encounter issues of clarity and reliability. To improve reliability, an
experienced qualitative researcher and I separately reviewed each audio transcript and
independently coded the interview data. NVIVO 10 qualitative data analysis software was
utilized by both coders to retain and organize the primary and secondary data flows, to execute
the coding process and to maintain a chain of evidence to further increase the reliability of the
information.
Codes were created in two ways. First, codes were developed deductively, using the
research question, models and frameworks that form this research. For example, motivation,
advancement, assimilation, holistic, horizon, harmonization, capability, structural, and contextual
are critical constructs in this study that translated directly into the coding process. This initial list
was subject to revision in the coding process to better fit the data collected. Second, codes were
also generated inductively, as significant insights were shared that had not been accounted for in
the a priori listing. An example of this inductive coding was the addition of culture, to which
several of the respondents ascribed importance in assimilating ERM.
During the first coding cycle, we utilized a descriptive coding method (Miles &
Huberman, 2014) with prescribed codes to classify the data into the essential phenomena on
which this research is based. Data coding was an iterative process, in which we resolved
inconsistencies through discussion and debate upon further review of the data. In the second
coding cycle, we looked for patterns and themes in the coded data to capture explanations of
what was occurring in the sample. A high degree of data consistency was revealed in the
triangulation across the different sources of primary and archival data.
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As the coding process continued, certain themes began to emerge. These themes
underscored similarities and differences between the organizations with respect to views on
upside value, how ambidexterity is achieved and the extent of the development of dynamic
capabilities. In the next chapter, I turn to a detailed analysis of the results of data collection and
analysis processes.
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V

CHAPTER V: RESULTS

This chapter is organized into three sections to report the study’s findings in light of the research
question, how do firms reconfigure assets, resources and capabilities in the operationalization of
ERM to consider both the downside and upside of risk? First, I provide demographic information
for the sample population to profile the experience and roles of the subjects in relationship to the
conduct of ERM in their respective organizations. Second, drawing upon the motivation,
advancement and assimilation phases of ERM adoption developed in the theoretical framework,
I explore the risk management foundations from which the companies migrated into an ERM
mode and configured resources to operationalize its practice. Lastly, I present data that illustrates
the alignment of the firms in their states of assimilation with the holistic, horizon and
harmonization consensus model of ERM. From these results, the configuration of people and
processes necessary to sustain the ERM commitment and to address the downside-upside duality
can be observed. Informed by these two perspectives, those of a temporal change process and
congruence with a unity model, I will examine the findings through the lens of ambidexterity as
a dynamic capability in the final chapter.
V.1 Demographic Information
Table 2 presents a summary of the demographic information. Primary data was collected through
semi-structured interviews with eight senior risk professionals representing four large
organizations. Also, and as previously noted, I have included a published interview with the
director of enterprise risk (DEM) of SecondoCo as secondary data. These organizations have
earned reputations of long-term commitments to the practice of ERM. In assembling the sample,
I sought to satisfy several important considerations that would positively impact the credibility of
the data. First, the respondents needed adequate tenure with their firms to have gained an
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appropriate depth of understanding of the overall business model and strategies of the firm.
Ranging from 14 to 36 years, the actual length of the interviewees’ experience is sufficient for
the purposes of this study. Further, with two exceptions, all of the interviewees have been with
their respective firms for the majority of their professional careers. CRO has been at PrimoU for
slightly less than half, and DRMs’ entire career has been with SecondoCo. Second, each of the
professionals should preferably have occupied a risk management role at the initiation of the
ERM adoption process in order to have the benefit of observations made at the point of
origination. In all but one instance, that of MERBA at SecondoCo, the condition was met,
although this subject did have an indirect association with ERM activities prior to moving into a
full-time ERM role. Additionally, potential gaps in knowledge were filled in by DRM and the
inclusion of the secondary interview data for DEM. Third, the subjects had to be actively
engaged in the ERM process at the time of the interview to capture contemporaneous
perspectives from active practitioners. This qualification was true for all subjects. Fourth, the
respondents should be at or above the director or director-equivalent level in the organizational
hierarchy to assure exposure to senior-level risk management issues, particularly those involving
strategy and operations. This condition was also met. Lastly, given the risk downside-upside
duality construct central to this study, both the legacy TRM and evolving ERM perspectives
must be represented in each organization. Including respondents having direct responsibilities in
each area satisfied this qualification. CRO, DRM, SDRM, and DRMQ have direct management
roles for the TRM functions at PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo, respectively and
also actively participate on ERM committees of these firms. The remaining subjects are almost
exclusively focused on ERM activities, with minimal to no day-to-day involvement in the TRM
domain.
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Table 2 Demographic Information

Scope of
risk
manageme
nt
responsibili
ty

Years of
risk
manageme
nt
experience

Length of
service
with
institution

TRM, ERM

35 years

15 years

R2 – SVP & General Counsel (SVP)

ERM

10 years

14 years

R3 – Director, Enterprise Risk (DEM)

ERM

17 years

17 years

R4 – Manager, Enterprise Risk &
Business Assurance (MERBA)

ERM

4 years

21 years

TRM, ERM

36 years

36 years

ERM

10 years

33 years

TRM, ERM

29 years

22 years

ERM

9 years

18 years

TRM, ERM

30 years

20 years

Respondent

PrimoU

Secondo
Co

R1 – Chief Risk Officer (CRO)

R5 – Director, Risk Management (DRM)

TerzoCo

R6 – Corporate ERM Manager (CEM)
R7 – Senior Director, Risk Management
(SDRM)

QuartoC
o

R8 – Director, Enterprise Risk
Management (DERM)
R9 – Director, Risk Management
(DRMQ)

V.2 Foundations of ERM
In this section, I explore the foundational elements of ERM adoption for PrimoU, SecondoCo,
TerzoCo and QuartoCo, which are summarized in Table 3.
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V.2.1 PrimoU.
From a loss exposure standpoint, a large U.S. university with an international presence generates
a diverse risk profile that yields complex risk management challenges to risk professionals. This
complexity is increased when a sizeable healthcare research and delivery system is fully
integrated into the university’s operational environment. Such was the case at PrimoU in 2005
when a new executive team arrived and began to develop strategic plans that required a
rethinking of the institution’s conduct of risk management.
In place at the time was a highly advanced clinical risk management program shaped by
patient safety and mandatory regulatory reporting requirements, and a less evolved TRM
approach to the non-healthcare side of the university. Several motivating factors then coalesced
to begin the journey to ERM:
A couple of different forces drove us to start ERM. First was the chair of our audit
committee, who was from the banking industry. The banking industry in say, 2005, was
deep into ERM; it was on everyone’s lips. He pushed it. We have a president who is an
engineer and likes this kind of thing. So that was one force. Another force was looking at
one of the highest profile risk issues of that decade, which was the Duke University
lacrosse team incident. (CRO)
A leadership team at PrimoU was assembled to conduct a due diligence exercise to
establish the objectives of the nascent ERM program, with the goals of breaking through
operational silos, identifying key exposures, assessing the institutional appetite for risk,
identifying best practices, planning proactively and prioritizing resources. Success in these ERM
activities was hoped to result in an environment in which negative surprises are minimized.
Progress was slow in coming, as the task failed to gain traction until the chief risk officer and the
general counsel “put our heads together and thought, ‘well, why don’t we try to figure something
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out?” (SVP). While no additional resources were allocated to positioning ERM in the
organization, the higher state of sophistication of the clinical risk management program acted as
an internal catalyst for the adoption effort:
And so whether they call it ERM or not, the reality is that they’ve [clinical risk
management at PrimoU] been thinking in those ways and with those concepts for many
years. They just didn’t call it enterprise risk management. And so when we introduced
enterprise risk management at PrimoU about eight years ago, folks on the healthcare
side were kind of scratching their heads because they’re saying, ‘that’s what we do.’
(CRO)
External practitioners had little influence on the formation of ERM at PrimoU, given the
lack of higher education-specific industry models or protocols to follow. “They were using an
approach and language and theory that was understandable to those already in the field” (SVP),
but not to those who were less engaged or had little risk management experience. Thus, the CRO
and the general counsel characterize the transition to ERM as “home grown”, utilizing existing
resources and declining assistance from consultants.
An important structural change at PrimoU involved the creation of several new groups,
drawing staffing from across the institution for the purpose of advancing ERM (Figure 1). First,
an ERM executive committee, chaired by the university president, was instituted to establish
policy and to oversee the full breadth of risks to the university. Its members “viewed ERM as the
tool for educating themselves” (CRO) about risk in a systematic way. Second, an ERM steering
committee consisting of senior operational leaders and administrators became the process
champions of ERM development. The chief risk officer, who also has continuing responsibility
for clinical risk management and TRM, which are functions that maintained separate corporate
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identities, chairs this committee. Lastly, ERM subcommittees were formed to incorporate the
subject matter expertise of individuals in the areas of finance, healthcare, research, information
technology, safety, physical plant, corporate affairs, student affairs and human resources. These

68

Table 3 Foundation of ERM
Earliest
organizational
exploration of
ERM

State of risk
management
function

Motivation to
adopt ERM

Primary
leaders of
ERM
adoption

Initial
investment
in ERM

External
influences

Bifurcated
between
clinical risk
management
and TRM for
general
university
functions

Experiences
from financial
services
industries;
occurrence of
major event in
higher
education
sector

Chair of
audit
committee
and new
executive
team –
president,
provost,
EVP
finance

Minimal;
internal
resources

Little to no use of
consultants;
industry
frameworks
reviewed but not
adopted

Well
established
TRM; risk
financing and
claims
management

SOX/404
legislation;
desire to break
through risk
silos and
coordinate
system wide

CFO, and
head of
financial
planning

Minimal;
internal
resources

Informed by
COSO framework
and
AS/NZS4360:200
4 standards

c. 2004

Well
established
TRM; global
risk financing
and claims
management

Questions from
rating agencies;
smaller
operational
groups unable
fund RM
activities; cost
reduction
pressure from
recession

Head of
TRM
function

Minimal;
internal
resources

Little to no use of
consultants;
highly informed
by COSO
framework

c. 2000

Well
established
TRM; global
risk financing
and claims
management

Integrated risk
financing
program;
interest in
aggregating
key
organizational
risks

Corporate
controller,
corporate
security,
TRM
director,
ERM
professiona
l through
acquisition

Minimal;
internal
resources

Moderate use of
consultants;
informed by
AS/NZS4360:200
4 standards

PrimoU

c. 2005

SecondoCo

c. 2003

TerzoCo

QuartoCo

69

risk management process owners (RMPOs) are assigned to develop individual risk management
plans for key risks uncovered in the course of risk identification and risk vetting activities. The
plans are presented directly to the Executive Committee by the RMPOs during annual “risk
hearings”, and are supportive of the goals originally proposed of ERM adoption. This bottom-up
and top-down communication formed new pathways for risk information to flow that had not
previously existed. As a result, the quality of the conversations about risk within PrimoU became
more robust and collaborative across the institution.
In budgetary terms, from the point of view of the chief risk officer “there’s no additional
expense associated with ERM. I have the staff necessary to do anything in connection with
ERM, so we just absorbed it”. The general counsel reinforces this observation:
So was it resourced? No, it wasn’t. And I think that was part of the reason it’s been
successful. If it was resourced and we said ‘here’s $250,000 to hire somebody’, then it
would have been a risk management thing sitting outside everything else. There would
have been incentive to justify that. By not resourcing it, several of us saw that it would
help us do our job better to have this in place. (SVP)
Undergirding the staffing, structure and processes operationalizing ERM at PrimoU are
several statements that articulate the university’s policy, strategic and tactical positions. First, the
policy of ERM adoption is presented as a “liberating attitude” to its various stakeholders:
Risk, in one form or another, is present in virtually all worthwhile endeavors. We
recognize that not all risk is bad and our goal is not to eliminate risk for by doing so we
would cease all productive activity. Rather, our goal is to assume risk judiciously,
mitigate it when possible, and prepare ourselves to respond effectively when necessary.
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Second, defining it on the institution’s terms, without reference to external definitions or
standards, shapes the strategic direction for ERM at PrimoU:
[ERM] is a holistic approach to risk management that provides a framework for entitywide risk identification, prioritization of key exposures and development of operational
responses to adverse events, based upon a foundation of ownership, accountability and
transparency.
Lastly, PrimoU adheres to a set of tactical “guiding principles” in the conduct of its ERM
program. These principles encompass proactivity through an early-warning system, prompt
reporting of adverse occurrences, remedial actions guided by the judicious assumption of risk,
effective communication and a culture of process improvement.
One of the keys to the longevity of the program has been the ability “to blend and
respond to the culture of the institution” (CRO). The introduction of ERM into PrimoU sparked
“an awakening at the leadership level and senior management level, particularly on the university
side about what it means…to think about risk in a way that the healthcare side has been doing for
many years” (CRO). Support from these executives is a critical success factor in the opinion of
the chief risk officer, since for change management of this nature, “ideal is top-down, always.”
This organic transition was initiated at and supported from the top of the organization, albeit
without the injection of new resources and with little contribution from ERM industry
practitioners. Changes in structure and process occurred to situate ERM into the existing
management control environment through the introduction of two new committees, an expansion
of roles and responsibilities took place with the line level managers that assumed risk ownership
duties, and lines of risk communication were formalized across the institution.
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At PrimoU, ERM has “graduated from being an initiative, something that has an end
date” (CRO). In the words of the general counsel, “I think ERM is now built into the fabric. The
question becomes, when this president leaves, will the next president be enthused about it?
Because without presidential leadership, it would whither and die.” (SVP)
V.2.2 SecondoCo.
A dedicated effort to create an ERM program at SecondoCo began in 2003.
It evolved out of the development of risk assessments and risk profiles for the utility’s smaller,
non-core businesses, and the formulation of broader risk policies and oversight of the company’s
sizeable energy trading and marketing operations. These activities took place outside of the
firm’s well-established, technically sophisticated TRM department that focused on risk financing
and mitigation solutions for property and casualty exposures. Pushing for changes in risk
management were “a few individuals who really had the foresight to start thinking about how
one dimensional our approach to risk management was…it was always very siloed” (MERBA).
Among these forward-thinking executives, the “fathers of our enterprise risk management
program” (MERBA), were the incumbent CFO, who assumed the role of chief risk officer, and
the head of the corporate financial planning organization. As part of the early ERM adoption
process, investments in additional staffing were considered. However, SecondoCo went in a
different direction:
They [CFO and other SecondoCo executives] proposed some larger organizations. They
even considered the concept of a VP of enterprise risk. Officially, that was never created.
They said, let’s leverage existing people. Let’s leverage existing processes. Let’s not
create a whole bunch of new committees. (MERBA)
The director, risk management, echoed this sentiment:
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But some companies early on, they built pretty big organizations around enterprise risk.
And I think our philosophy has been look, let’s keep this lean. Let’s not build some big
bureaucratic process. Let’s keep it lean and let’s keep it fresh. And so I think we’ve been
very successful in doing that. It’s not building an empire around enterprise risk.
SecondoCo, given its critical infrastructure categorization and the regulatory environment
in which it operates, had a culture built around an acute awareness of risk, which is core to its
organizational design:
When you think about SecondoCo’s business model, we really are a low risk business
model proposition. That’s what we sell. Those are the shareholders and bondholders we
attract. We’re very much a low risk business model. (MERBA)
Consequently, the expectation regarding ERM as it moved forward was that it “is going to
become not a program, but part of the company’s culture. I think it has to be viewed that way to
be successful” (DEM). One of the biggest cultural challenges the firm faced in the early days of
implementing ERM was the “natural reluctance of people to share a lot of information about the
risks they face” (DEM). Risk information had not always been effectively communicated within
the organization, particularly to upper management. This failure was due in part to the lack of a
systematic way to do so, and also out of fear, real or imagined, that it could be used in some way
against those responsible for managing it.
Structurally, the new ERM group reported through the finance organization (Figure 2).
Three subunits emerged from the reallocation of existing assets, which provided shared services
to multiple functional areas across the SecondoCo system. These internal consulting capabilities
included quantitative risk financing analytics, enterprise risk oversight, and trading and hedging
transactions. While the ERM group maintained a strong connection with the firm’s strategic
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planning group and with the corporate governance organization, the direct reporting line through
finance reflected strong opinions on how the organizational alignment of ERM should be
executed:
I don’t think that the internal audit organization ought to be primarily responsible for
enterprise risk. I don’t think that’s a good strategy. Auditors are still viewed as corporate
policemen. They’re more about management control and accounting controls, and
they’ve got a different role to play. The enterprise risk effort has to dovetail with it –
internal audit – because you actually need internal audit to go out and test and validate
and ensure that you’ve got certain controls in place, that you’ve got enterprise risk
processes in place and it’s working and effective. (DRM)
As the ERM adoption effort progressed, TRM continued to operate as a separate
functional area, also reporting into finance, focused as it had been in the past primarily on risk
mitigation tools and techniques including loss prevention, risk financing, and contractual risk
management. However, as risks outside of the traditional domain came into the ERM scope, the
TRM unit was called upon for its expertise in exploring potential market-based insurance
solutions. Similarly, “the treasury organization, when it comes to managing interest rate risks or
foreign exchange risks, [is] on a more granular level” (DRM), and retained a distinct risk
management identity.
External consultants were not a significant factor in the adoption of ERM at SecondoCo.
However, industry ERM frameworks played a prominent role in the development of the practice.
Elements drawn from COSO:2004, ISO31000:2009 and AS/NZS4360:2004 each provided
influence, but without overemphasis on a particular standard:
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I don’t think we’re any one, but if you were to line up our program with those, you could
see how we align. At the end of the day, we still geared it to what we think was best for
SecondoCo, but the standards certainly gave some initial structural ideas. (MERBA)
The ERM group handled higher-level risk identification and assessment, introducing a
new risk profile process to determine critical exposure areas. Reaching out to functional
individual risk contacts horizontally and risk executives in all subsidiaries and business units
vertically. To the goal of leveraging existing resources, this central ERM staffing
was very small. We believe in leaning on lots of dotted line relationships, so those groups
that we lean on have what we would call a risk contact, which would be the equivalent of
a line manager who has their day job, but also takes on this role. (MERBA)
While the budget for the internally reconfigured ERM group is identifiable, the broader ERM
effort is “just embedded in the organization, acknowledging that ERM in its purest sense is a part
of everybody’s job so it’s a component of everybody’s budget by default” (MERBA).
In its assimilation state, the goal of ERM at SecondoCo is to support the firm’s low risk
value proposition by “optimiz[ing] the relationship between risk and return by establishing a
culture and risk oversight structure that encourages sound risk-taking balanced by effective risk
management practices.” Three pillars support this proposition: first, a risk culture that promotes a
high degree of risk awareness and open communication; second, risk governance that ensures
proper oversight and transparency; and lastly, risk management controls, procedures and
practices to mitigate risk.
In summary, a few key executives having the desire to address risk across organizational
subdivisions and to improve the flow of risk information up and down the firm led the existing
risk-aware culture at SecondoCo into the direction of ERM. In response to the guidance of these
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risk champions, a dedicated ERM group was created, staffed utilizing existing resources. To
accommodate the ERM push into the organization, managers in line level roles took on
responsibility to become part of a firm-wide network of risk contacts. TRM continues to operate
as a separate function but participates in the broader ERM conversation through its parallel
reporting relationship into the finance organization. These activities have resulted in ERM
becoming “an established system of processes and structures” (MERBA), a program that is
rather deeply embedded. It gets a lot of attention from the executive management team
and the board of directors. There are regular discussions around it, robust discussions.
It’s not just an exercise we go through. It’s important. And it’s conveyed as important.
It’s flowing up from the bottom. It’s coming down from the top. And that’s part of a
formalized process where we are thinking about risk on a regular basis. It’s planned, not
ad hoc or informal. Our formal enterprise risk process is that every year and periodically
during the year, we are looking at those risks and thinking about them, putting them on
paper. (DRM)
V.2.3 TerzoCo.
“Risk management existed as a part of the culture” (SDRM) of TerzoCo in 2004, when it was
conducted independently in multiple areas across the organization. It was during this period
when “a variety of forces came together, a perfect storm of events” (CEM) both externally and
internally occurred that oriented the firm toward consideration of ERM. First, insurance carriers,
including those that provided coverage to TerzoCo, in the post-9/11 era had gained a heightened
awareness of the concentration risks of large organizations. This led to the carriers’ reassessment
of not just the profitability results of individual product lines, but also the aggregate risk profiles
of their customers for underwriting acceptability. Second, rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s
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and Moody’s in particular, began to take note of ERM programs in their ratings methodologies.
Third, directors serving on the TerzoCo board were becoming influenced by their involvement in
other organizations adopting ERM, and supportive of considering an ERM approach at TerzoCo.
Fourth, the company committed to having an “equality of true concerns” (CEM) in risk
management. This phrase captures the institutional desire to break through the risk silos within
TerzoCo that enabled large operating groups to manage risk on their own, to the detriment of
smaller groups that had less budget, little input on risk management issues and yet potentially
high-risk profiles. Fifth, the U.S. economic recession “squeezed the fluff out of the information
technology and engineering budgets” (CEM) at TerzoCo, forcing even these large, well-funded
business units to shed cost and rethink risk management. Lastly, the senior director of TRM, who
became the main conceptual proponent of ERM, began to think about risk holistically. “There
was nothing to join the pieces, and we need a process to knit together the different types of risks
in functional areas. Some risks are easier to assign to risk owners, others are cross-functional and
need coordination” (SDRM). Given its responsibility for all insurance risk transfer plans
globally, including the firm’s two captive insurance facilities, TRM reported into the treasury
department. However, the TRM director, in seeking to build collaboration across organizational
lines, reached out to the head of audit and compliance and the general counsel with initial
thoughts about whether ERM would be a fit for the company.
From these discussions a critical initiative was launched out of the TRM department to
explore ERM adoption, with joint reporting through finance and global procurement and in close
association with the crisis management and business continuity departments, both of which were
under the firm’s security group. To guide the initiative a steering committee was formed,
consisting of representatives from TRM, legal, audit and compliance, security, public relations
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and human resources. Functional diversification enabled the committee to “take a whole process
view to understand the importance of each link in the chain” (CEM) of risk management. This
core unit did not include representatives from operations, engineering, and strategy at the outset,
although these major functional areas and with them, information technology, were eventually
added. Among the primary tasks of the committee was to undertake a key risk identification
process to consider the changing and emerging risks that TerzoCo faced, especially to uncover
where management gaps existed in the management of catastrophe risk and strategic risk
exposures.
In 2008 the risk management function at TerzoCo underwent a restructuring, one in
which the ERM process and its leader were spun out of the direct responsibility of the TRM team
and aligned with two “sister groups” (CEM), compliance and ethics and internal audit, all of
which reported up to the TerzoCo audit committee (Figure 3). TRM continued as a separate unit
reporting into finance, albeit with “dramatically enhanced visibility and value - the group is a key
player in the room” (SDRM) given its central role in initiating the ERM concept. Additionally,
an enterprise risk council was formed, co-chaired by the chief legal officer and the vice president
of audit and compliance, reporting to the management committee and including representation
from TRM and the company’s primary functional areas.
External consultants were not of material importance to the ERM effort, as they proved
unable to “take [our] ideas, and implement process” (CEM). In contrast, the COSO framework
provided substantial guidance to shaping TerzoCo’s approach to structuring ERM and its
operationalization. TerzoCo places particular emphasis upon weaving the quality of the dialog
concerning risk into the COSO definition and in the conceptualization of ERM for the company:
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The central value of an ERM program is found in its ability to provide an organization
with a systemic awareness of potential risk events. It does not generate intelligence, it is
a consumer of information provided by all parts of the organization and it all begins with
a conversation. (CEM)
Little incremental cost was incurred to adopt ERM at TerzoCo, with incidental expenses
limited to additional meetings and administrative headcount. Internal leverage of existing
capabilities was an importance factor, as was the formalization of activities that were already
running. The objective for the ERM leadership team was to facilitate formerly implicit processes
explicitly, and not to create new infrastructure.
From the outset, the intention of TerzoCo was not to have ERM function in a stand-alone
capacity or to be unconnected with the mainstream processes of the firm. Rather, ERM was
recognized as a missing element from management routines, and it has become culturally
embedded in the organization as its “circulatory system” (CEM). In the opinion of the corporate
ERM manager, “we couldn’t take ERM out even if we wanted to.” Adoption has enabled the
firm to overcome the risk management “secret organization, where risks are known only to a few
and a ‘wall of worry’ is created. There is now a formal process of risk recognition, identification
and mitigation” (CEM). ERM is more than a program in the company, “it is a big process,
ongoing, living and breathing. We are doing well, but we’ll never be done” (SDRM). The
TerzoCo board of directors is fully supportive of ERM, and is engaged in pulling the process
throughout the firm. This board support is reflected in the inclusion of ERM in the proxy
statement, audit committee reports and the company policy handbook, the latter of which has
been published for over 75 years. In short, ERM is “just part of doing business the right way”
(SDRM).
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Nonetheless, one of the original prime movers behind ERM at TerzoCo, the TRM
manager, expresses a measure of dissatisfaction with the quality of the assimilation:
I’m not happy with where we are. There are some major weaknesses we need to deal
with. First, we are depending too much on expert judgment to assess the likelihood and
impact of risk without having great ability to quantify that risk. Second, I don’t think we
still do a great job of understanding the correlations on our risk map. We need to do the
obvious and be more objective about quantification. And third, we’re still managing siloby-silo, not understanding interplay and correlation. The biggest barrier to overcoming
these weaknesses is that we’re not a bank…we don’t have big data and internal financial
risks that can be more readily quantified. A lot of our big risks are external and less
controllable, which gets us back to relying on expert judgment rather than quantification.
So the Holy Grail, then, is quantification.
V.2.4 QuartoCo.
While the initial consideration of ERM at QuartoCo began years earlier, a clear line of
demarcation establishing a “modern day view” (DRMQ) occurred in 2010 when a major
acquisition set the stage for a significant advancement of the practice of ERM in the company.
V.2.4.1 Pre-2010.
Concurrent tracks of advanced risk management exploration were taking place during the early
2000s in two separate areas of QuartoCo: the strategic security function and the TRM
department. First, the strategic security group undertook an officially sanctioned yet informal
effort to start a comprehensive corporate risk identification process. This task, led by an
individual in the security group “with the most passion and the most foresight to do something in
ERM” (DERM) attempted to build a programmatic approach to assembling input from the field
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level of the firm, and rolling this data up to a summary level of key risks. An ad-hoc risk
committee with risk owners from across the organization participated in surveys and elementary
risk ranking exercises, but this data collection exercise was executed on discrete paths
without the mindset of trying to think through how does the risk that I manage in my
group actually correlate and correspond with what I’m learning from other risk
owners…it was a lot of flurry of activity, but I don’t think we had a lot of gelling at that
time. (DRMQ)
Consequently, little progress was made as the work involved “a lot of two steps forward and one
step back trying to get a grassroots group of people together to give some input to this process”
(DRMQ). At the senior management level of the firm, conceptual debates over ERM adoption
were taking place, also resulting in a lack of forward progress:
They were trying to build a risk universe to embed in the business. There was some
discussion on how can you integrate enterprise risk management within the corporate
audit department and the way they’re planning resources. So there were activities, but it
wasn’t quite well thought out. (DERM)
For a substantial investment, the security group commissioned a consulting project to develop a
risk assessment graphical analysis product, and subsequently, an additional expenditure into an
early version of ERM information system software. Neither of these proved to be of consequence
in the ERM adoption process.
Second, and beginning prior to the security group led ERM initiative, the TRM
department had been independently pursuing an integrated approach to risk financing, stretching
the boundaries of how such programs were typically effectuated in the commercial insurance
marketplace. This cross-product line program design blended self-insurance and risk transfer
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mechanisms on a multi-year basis, combining traditionally insurable risks with several other risk
categories that were outside of traditional scope. The motivation behind taking such a different
strategy in the TRM domain was, in the words of the director of risk management, to
explore what we can do because right now, it’s just year after year, renewal after
renewal, separate lines of coverage, individual transactions, no connectivity. And it just
seemed like there should be a leverage factor that we were not getting. (DRMQ)
Managing risks on a structured financial portfolio basis represented a step towards ERM,
conceptually, and was a leading-edge management process in the company. Nonetheless,
“without having vision to operational risks, IT risks, business consumer issue risks or marketing
risks” (DRMQ), many organizational risk silos remained in place.
V.2.4.2 Post-2010.
After the closing of an acquisition of a sizeable global distribution network, the fledgling efforts
toward ERM adoption at QuartoCo were catalyzed by two individuals: an executive from the
legacy organization who took on a prominent role and the other, an experienced ERM
practitioner from the acquired firm. First, the former head of audit from QuartoCo became the
newly appointed controller of the combined organization, bringing support and credibility to the
ERM adoption effort. This executive
basically decided she wanted the function [ERM] and she wanted to go do that. She said,
‘We need this. We need to do it for lots of reasons. We need to be much more proactive.’ I
would say her introduction to this concept was certainly from a Sarbanes-Oxley
traditional audit background. I do think she can be somewhat visionary as well though.
And I don’t know that her view at all was limited to that component – elements of
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managing risk. But I think having had that background; she certainly was in the chatter
already of Sarbanes-Oxley, COSO. These were familiar terminologies for her. (DERM)
Second, from the acquired organization came its manager of ERM. This risk professional
possessed a background in strategic logistics, and in 2006 had become the lone resource
dedicated to implementing ERM in the distribution company, working in this role up to the time
of the sale of the company to QuartoCo.
In the process of integrating the businesses, QuartoCo committed two internal resources
to ERM: the ERM manager from the acquisition and an existing QuartoCo employee with
experience in operations, global finance, organizational transformation and information
technology. This two-person group was then moved from under strategic security and began
reporting to the controller, and in turn to the CFO. As ERM advanced through the firm a virtual,
voluntary team of interested participants emerged, extending the reach of the small, central ERM
unit into the geographic business units and functional areas of the company. This team was
composed of “four or five people who were really the brain trust…of what ‘good’ looks like in
risk management” (DERM), defined in large part by the standard set by the TRM director’s
integrative risk financing work.
As the virtual team progressed its efforts, it found willingness on the part of the managers
in the field “to do the right thing, but they didn’t have the language skills across the functions
and there was not any kind of collection of focus of mitigation activities in the company”
(DRMQ). To meet this challenge, and to bring coherence to the overall adoption exercise, ERM
within QuartoCo evolved into multitier structure (Figure 4). At the base of this organizational
model are four diversified sub-units drawing members from across the company on a virtual,
matrix-reporting basis: a corporate level risk council, which succeeded the virtual ERM team; a
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combined corporate and field-level ERM working group; a field level collection of ERM process
leaders embedded in the business units; and an ERM best practices network dedicated to the
distribution system. The two-person ERM team that reported into the corporate controller
coordinated the overall activities of these four groups. In turn, this entire assemblage of ERM
resources is accountable to the ERM executive sponsors of the firm, the CFO, and chief
administrative officer, and the to the audit committee that has ultimate ERM program oversight.
The major difference between the pre-2010 era and the adoption and implementation of
ERM at QuartoCo post-2010 is two-fold. First, when considered from an executive management
standpoint,
we understand we have a corporate risk management governance responsibility that we
take very seriously. And part of that is to hold strategic risk assessment processes to
understand the profile from the top, taking all these risks from the field and from the
business and the corporate functions and coming together, and doing this in a robust
manner. Part of that is to ensure that we actually have proper governance routines and
oversight routines with the board of directors, and that certain board committees should
oversee certain buckets of risk. (DERM)
Along with the acknowledgment of this governance responsibility, the second difference is
establishing the practice of ERM as an accepted and perpetuated management process in the
firm:
We find ourselves really focusing on how you establish risk management as a capability.
People want to do risk management and they want to do it well. They want it in very
simple terms and they want to have a strong foundation and use that foundation to figure
out how to do it well. We had five risk treatment programs in place. How do they
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correlate? How do they connect? What do they mean? Who is the contact person? And
how do we pull all this together? We pull this all together by including them within the
basket of what we’re doing to manage our enterprise risk. (DERM)
In summary, the board of directors have fully committed to the practice of ERM at
QuartoCo, based upon its recurring position on the agenda:
Every April quarterly board meeting will be the ERM meeting, and this will be the sixth
year in a row. It’s pretty well ingrained in the culture. I assume it’s going to occur this
year and it’s going to occur next year. It’s a big change. I mean 25 percent of the board
meetings are 100 percent dedicated to ERM. (DRMQ)
V.3 Assimilation of ERM
In the previous section, I presented a process view of how large, committed organizations are
motivated to advance and assimilate ERM into their operating environments. I now turn to a
different perspective, which is how PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo in the
assimilation phase align with the three dimensions of the emerging consensus model: holistic
integration of silos, horizon expanded to emerging and existing risks, and harmonization of
downside control and upside value. Combining a process view of ERM adoption-led resource
configuration with an explication of the key dimensional factors upon which that configuration is
based provides an informed understanding of ERM, upon which the lens of ambidexterity as a
dynamic capability can be focused.
V.3.1 Holistic
V.3.1.1 PrimoU.
ERM is acknowledged as “a facilitation mechanism for crossing departmental silos” (CRO) at
PrimoU. In actual practice, this interlacing property is effectuated in several distinct, yet related
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ways. First, common interests to exposures to loss are connected ex-ante through the transfer of
knowledge:
Our ERM structure forces us to think about it in terms of one exposure, not two. And so
from there, you have kind of a domino effect. That means you have people with shared
interests coming to the table to figure out solutions. You have people learning from one
another if one has figured out a solution. It helps to provide some kind of bond in a
system that is incredibly huge. (CRO)
Second, the aperture through which potential loss impact is viewed is widened to considerations
beyond the instant event:
What we’re worried about is a series of losses which taken in the aggregate creates a
reputational problem or a financial exposure telling us that there’s a deeper systemic
problem. And the problem is the systemic problem as opposed to just the loss number.
(SVP)
Third, three horizontal structural components were created at PrimoU in the process of adopting
ERM that directly integrate people and process: the RMPOs, the ERM steering committee and
the ERM executive sponsors committee. The RMPOs are in day-to-day functional management
roles spanning the university and healthcare domains. At the ERM steering committee level are
the college deans, directors, assistant vice presidents and vice presidents. Assembled within the
ERM executive committee are the direct reports to the university president, which includes
senior vice presidents and the c-suite officers. This group is also specifically responsible for
reputational and strategic risk oversight. Lastly, the integrated horizontal structures are aligned in
a vertical hierarchy that enables bottom-up and top-down communication. “The risk silos are
managed by the RMPOs, and then aggregated at the next level up in the organization” (CRO).
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V.3.1.2 SecondoCo.
A consistent thread in the ERM adoption experience of SecondoCo is a coordinated view of risk,
since “early on with ERM, the idea was instead of looking at these risks in isolation, let’s look at
the interplay between them and how they affect the overall risk profile. There are some risks that
we have joint ownership of” (DRM). Senior management support at SecondoCo supplies the
necessary organizational energy to move from observation to action: “If you’ve got commitment
at the top level of the organization and you’ve got your ERM process set up right, it facilitates
dialogue across what were silos before” (DRM). A key activity employed by SecondoCo to
enable such conversations is the risk profile process, a systematic method of risk assessment and
mitigation companywide,
for all of our subsidiaries, business units and functions. ERM has actually been pushed
down within the organization to the point now where we do risk assessments and profiles
in our power plants. Ultimately, what comes out of this risk profile process feeds up into
our consolidated view. (DEM)
As the participating organizational entities for the risk profile process are identified, namely
those that exceed a risk materiality threshold, risk officers are appointed and assume
management responsibility for process coordination. In the course of the process, significant risk
areas are analyzed, and the officers develop individual risk profiles. Collaboration takes place in
executive risk discussion meetings with the ERM group, the senior vice president of finance, the
CFO/chief risk officer and each business subunit’s senior executives. Classification of
aggregated risks is done at a moderate level of abstraction:
We have resisted efforts to force things into really broad buckets like operational risk.
We do look at each individual risk and we categorize to bring those together into buckets

87

such as governance risk or environmental items. We have not tried to for the
categorization of risks into buckets as large as operational. (DEM)
The preexisting structural pathway for communicating risk information and insight upward from
the risk profile process is through the executive management committee, and in turn to the risk
oversight committee, the CEO and the board of directors. Additionally, the company
has integrated and created links among the various risk-related functions as part of
ERM. This includes the ERM group, internal auditing, legal and regulatory compliance,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and business assurance. (DEM)
V.3.1.3 TerzoCo.
Maintaining the position that “no risk is independent” (CEM), ERM at TerzoCo takes “an
intelligent view of risk complexity” (CEM). The company is focused on the connectivity and
systemic impact of risk, both downstream from the point of origin and cross-stream among its
business units. Risk silos are overcome by having “everyone in the conversation about risk”
(CEM), not just a small group of senior managers or through informal discussions.
Structurally, risk and compliance committees at the district and regional level perform
initial assessments. At one level up is a critical element in the process of risk integration, which
is the firm’s enterprise risk council. Co-chaired by the chief legal officer and the vice president
of audit and compliance, with members from domestic operations, engineering, finance,
accounting, human resources, information technology, international operations, legal and public
affairs, public relations, TRM, sales, marketing, security and strategy, this group develops
assessments and profiles of risks that require corporate level monitoring and makes status
determinations on a tiered basis. Overlaying the ERM structure at TerzoCo is a comprehensive
enterprise risk and control framework, which rationalizes elements found in the COSO model:
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management committee risk sponsorship, risk categories, enterprise risk counsel sponsors and
detailed risk categories.
As indicated in the previous section, and despite the progress made through a formalized
vertical structure, an industry-standard based framework and processes all targeted at risk
integration, execution is lagging expectations. More objective quantification of risk interactivity
is desired, demanding “real-time, granular access to data, which will require an expanded role for
information technology” (SDRM) in ERM.
V.3.1.4 QuartoCo.
The TRM unit achieved a specialized form of bridging risk silos in the pre-2010 era when
this team developed an integrated risk financing program. In the post-acquisition period, the
newly placed ERM director moved to reestablish “the individual risk owners based on the risks
identified in the company, and the quarterly or semi-frequent meetings of these risk owners to
even get them in the same room” (DRMQ).
During the evolution of the structure of the ERM program at QuartoCo, three of the four
ERM core work groups brought together areas of the company that formerly operated in a silo
fashion. In turn, these groups roll up to the two-person controller level ERM unit, which provides
an additional platform for integration. An opportunity has been identified for further
development:
My view would be that the logical next step in the maturity model for our company is to
not just sit in a room and have awareness that I manage a risk, and I have colleagues
who also manage risk, but the next level to me would be quite a bit more collaboration.
This should reflect intentional collaboration between those risk owners to help roll up
cumulative risk to the [controller level ERM unit] so that they could present that in a
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more consolidated manner up through to the board, that they could bring big categories
of risk and how are they being managed maybe across three or four of our risk owners as
opposed to individual ones. For example, maybe ERM can look at a bigger picture
analysis of what is the overall risk from a marketing standpoint. I think that there’s a lot
more of that happening in little pieces across the company. (DRMQ)
V.3.2 Horizon
V.3.2.1 PrimoU.
Adoption of ERM at PrimoU enables the institution to “monitor risks that constantly come in and
out of the radar” (CRO). Indeed, one of the motivating factors behind the university’s move in
the direction of ERM was the highly visible, negative publicity resulting from the allegations
against the Duke lacrosse team from a risk exposure that was at the time not being considered.
This untoward event demonstrates that the risk horizon of the institution has dynamic properties,
requiring constant monitoring:
We periodically re-evaluate the list of risks. Inherent in the ERM framework is the
recognition that priorities change over time; therefore, the risks are expected to shift in
response to changes in the operating environment. (CRO)
Another aspect of the expansionist nature of the horizon dimension is the inclusion of
higher-level risk classifications, particularly strategy and operations, which at PrimoU were not
linked to either the legacy TRM or clinical risk management groups. With the advent of ERM,
the university went in a direction “primarily focused on operational risks, and did not attempt to
replace the valuable strategic planning processes that PrimoU, like most other higher education
institutions, engages in regularly” (CRO). Therefore, the impact of ERM on strategic risk
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hasn’t been much. It’s starting to. But it was but it was sort of consciously not involved at
that level at the start. Our philosophy was to start with the university functions and work
up toward strategic analysis. ERM literature often takes the opposite approach,
encouraging an initial engagement at the strategic level. We had concerns that such an
approach would be too abstract and we decided to stay with the bottom-up approach.
(CRO)
V.3.2.2 SecondoCo.
Scanning the risk horizon is integral to the ERM program at SecondoCo. The embedded nature
of ERM in the organization’s processes, controls, decision tools, governance and oversight
structures extends its reach into strategic risk considerations. As a part of the firm’s risk profiling
process, there is “a component dedicated to emerging risks and new issues coming out. We’re
really trying to foster that discussion of what’s coming around the curve” (MERBA). A
systematic approach to risk classification clarifies the firm’s priorities:
We’ve got a top risks list that’s an arbitrary number right now; it’s like 13 different risks.
Those are our top SecondoCo risks. There is a second tier risk list of those that haven’t
made it up there, and then there’s a list of more emerging risks that we’re keeping an eye
on. In our industry for example, we’re watching distributed generation, which is a big
one. (MERBA)
TerzoCo. An expanded risk horizon is implicit in in TerzoCo’s ERM value statement,
which cites the “ability to provide an organization with a systemic [emphasis added] awareness
of potential risk events.” In the case of TerzoCo, the ERM risk frontier encompasses business
objectives, capital allocation, overall strategic goals and all operational and functional areas of
the company. The boundaries of this risk scope have been extended beyond those that had been
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contemplated in the pre-ERM era, which were first reviewed during the firm’s initial key risk
identification process. Further, the organization is moving its ERM efforts toward a balance of
ground-up and top-down management of risk with the development of “mini ERM on a regional
basis, with steering councils that add local flavor and nuance” (SDRM). Among the
responsibilities of these councils is assisting in the more rapid identification of emerging risk
trends.
V.3.2.3 QuartoCo.
From the perspective of the TRM director, the changing risk horizon to which ERM is oriented
demands constant attention:
The question that we try to think about every day in our world is: What can I be doing in
my capability of managing risk in QuartoCo financially that I haven’t thought of or that
we’re not doing already? Which type of risk – which item of risk should be added into a
basket somewhere that I’m not even looking at? And there are some clear ‘emergers’ that
have happened in the course of the last couple of years. Things like employment related
issues, employment practices issues, wage and hour issues. These are things in the
insurance world that didn’t exist before. There was not an answer to those pieces until
relatively recent time. (DRMQ)
Contributing to the emerging risks is the competitive landscape and accelerated pace at which
QuartoCo must operate. As the firm adjusts to its new normal environment, it is faced with a
broader risk horizon:
Look, the world is changing and we may not be dealing with the big firms as much as we
used to that have the whole package, that have the insurance program, that get the
management risk, that go through the clear vetting process. Things are moving a lot
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faster now, and we’ve got to get to market a lot faster and we’ve got to be the first one
out there. (DRMQ)
From the point of view of its contribution to strategy, the impact of ERM
is probably evolving. And I think what it looked like a couple of years ago is probably a
little bit different than today. At least somebody in a decision-making space is looking at
the risks across the company and trying to think strategically about where do they see the
company going? This is the leadership of the company, this is the board and our key
executives who are part of the board as well. They are setting the strategy for the
company on a going forward basis. (DERM)
A concrete example of how ERM has had a direct impact on strategic planning at QuartoCo
involves a significant international project:
We have a large-scale productivity initiative going on– very large scale. So we’ve
been involved in actually setting up a government structure because there’s a huge
potential impact on the business from the standpoints of controls, business continuity and
financial risk. So we’re involved in that and actually help the businesses understand that
we’re going to manage the risks. But that’s the extent to where we actually influence
those decisions. (DERM)
A contrarian opinion associated with the holistic dimension offers a different perspective
of the risk horizon:
My opinion is in general, most of the risks have been out there so you’re not going to find
a lot of new risks per se. You know, some things go up and down. Where I do think the
biggest gap is – learning from other people who have actually managed the risk. That is I
think the big gap. (DERM)
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Having gained insight into the holistic and horizon elements of ERM, in this last section I
explore the data for the third dimension of the emerging consensus model, which is
harmonization. This dimension, described by the duality of managing risk to minimize its
downside impact and at the same time managing risk to maximize its upside value, is at the heart
of ambidexterity. Given the historical commitment of resources to and path dependency of risk
control and mitigation activities evidenced in the data, spanning both pre- and post-ERM
adoption, I have not presented purely downside improvement ERM narratives for PrimoU,
SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo to further amplify the point. Rather, I will focus on the
understanding the complexities of the less visible and somewhat more abstract upside value
constructs in the sample companies, including downside-upside comparisons that assist in
explicating the upside differential proposed of ERM.
V.3.3 Harmonization.
V.3.3.1 PrimoU.
Conceptually, PrimoU recognizes the two-sided nature of risk, acknowledging that “not all risk
is bad and our goal is not to eliminate all risk, for by doing so we would cease all productive
activity” (CRO). ERM adoption contributes to converting this proclamation to action as “people
get more comfortable assuming risk. You know, some might look at it [ERM] and say, “Oh,
well, this identifies the risk, it keeps us from doing risky things” (SVP).
Beyond the conceptual statements, industry classification characteristics play a prominent
role in how PrimoU defines value:
My view is that the proxy in our world for shareholder value is reputational quality. The
purpose according to law of a corporation is to maximize shareholder value. If you think
about a university, we don’t have shareholder value. But we’ve got lots of stakeholders –
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alumni, people who live in the community, trustees, etc. And what is the common interest
that they have that lifts all the other activities? I believe it’s the quality of our reputation.
(SVP)
Given the importance of enhancing reputational quality and granted that downside risk control
mechanisms are in place to protect it, the search for potential new upside value from ERM with
respect to enhanced reputation leads in a direction of gaining competitive advantage, but with
limitations:
So if you’re thinking is there a way to measure the favorable impact of ERM on PrimoU
vis-à-vis other universities, I would be interested if you could. I don’t know how. That
would be hard. If you just picked a measure of performance, a dimension of performance
and said, ‘has ERM impacted this dimension of performance?’ You might be able to do
that. It just would be hard to pick one measure of performance or one cluster and say this
is the measure. (SVP)
Actual measures of increased value from ERM then, are at this point for PrimoU, premature:
Revenue is important. But we don’t have a stock price. We don’t have earnings. We’re
measured by how well we perform our mission. How do you do it when you’re not
measuring something that has financial performance? (SVP)
Since quantification of the ERM upside at PrimoU is at this juncture beyond the institution’s
scope, and no additional investments were made to adopt and implement ERM, cost-benefit
analytics are not calculated. Over time, PrimoU envisions a tiered understanding of value
upwards into the institution, as “part of the plan going forward to get PrimoU to think more like
a business” (CRO). In that regard, a negotiating point made by the university in its insurance
transactions is that ERM has improved its overall risk profile. The results are inconclusive,
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however: “We certainly talk about it. How much do the [underwriters] factor it in? I don’t know”
(SVP).
Nonetheless, the influence of ERM beyond pure risk mitigation is beginning to be
associated with the broader interests of the university, as in the case of the strategic application
of ERM resources in advance of a recent large acquisition to facilitate the transaction. This
involvement is also subject to limitations:
But even that is focused on the risks associated with the transaction as opposed to an
ERM approach where we want might to allocate resources opportunistically. ERM has
not entered into those discussions. (SVP)
Explicit value qualification is recognized at PrimoU, as in increased “transparency and
quality of communication around risk, particularly in ‘risk forums’”(CRO), and job
effectiveness: “It was worth the time and energy because it makes my job better. Everybody else
is the same way. And so we have the advantage enough people who saw the value in doing it”
(SVP). Thus the implementation of ERM has provided a “framework and a structure to have
discussions about risk and risk relativities” (SVP) that were not occurring in the past.
In summary, the downside element of the downside-upside duality dominates the
thinking at PrimoU:
What’s changing now is this year, we’re embarking on a new effort to take the top risks
that we see and have a concentrated briefing to the board of trustees or the appropriate
committee. And we’re getting closer to answering the classical question, “what keeps you
up at night?” But it’s still not thinking of risk strategies as opportunities. It’s still about
the risks. (SVP)
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V.3.3.2 SecondoCo.
Expressed as a broad policy statement, ERM at SecondoCo “is an ongoing and evolving effort by
which the company attempts to enhance the value of the firm by efficiently and effectively
managing risk across the SecondoCo system. Thorough understanding of risk and
communication of risk can actually lead to better decisions and better allocation of capital.” This
attitude toward risk originates at the top of the organization:
[The CEO] loves to use the phrase ‘value is a function of risk and return’. He says that
all the time. It’s one of his mantras. And so it was always that mindset. Our company was
very good about focusing on return. We understood net income and profits and things
like that, but oftentimes you weren’t always thinking about the risk side of it. Like making
sure that you’re getting the appropriate amount of return for the amount of risk that
you’re taking on. And so I think in the spirit of that, they’re saying we need to be much
more educated in the projects, tasks, capital expenditures, whatever it may be that the
company is taking on and making sure that we’re getting the right risk-adjusted return.
(MERBA)
The role of ERM in effectuating the risk value proposition is also directed from the top down:
Our CEO is passionate about thinking about disruptors to our industry, and thinking
about opportunities as well for our company. And so that’s where I think the strategic
piece integrates well into ERM so that it’s not just about the downside of risk, but the
opportunities associated with managing your business as well. (MERBA)
Further, the value implications of ERM are conceptually linked with the strategic foundation of
the organization, as a positive contribution: “Our strategy is predicated on risk management and
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our risk profile. So ERM certainly adds value to the degree that it helps us with our risk profile
and to maintain that risk profile” (DEM).
The economics of ERM at SecondoCo appear to be at least a background consideration in
the overall context of the program. With respect to management incentives and individual
commitments to the practice of ERM,
certainly from the board to the C-suite, it’s clearly communicated that enterprise risk is a
high priority. I think in various ways in the organization, there are incentives in the
performance plans of the management team and the employees that feed into that. There
are subjective rewards for managing those risks prudently and it impacts subjectively the
performance plan of individuals and their compensation. I say subjectively because I
don’t think you would typically see a hard dollar metric or some other kind of metric in a
compensation plan that says you’ll need to reduce your risk profile by x amount. But I
think certainly you would be rewarded or penalized as a manager in this company for not
doing your job as well. (DRM)
Cost-benefit calculations of ERM are judged to be theoretically possible, but are not conducted
either regularly or on a widespread basis at SecondoCo:
I think you can do that within an organization. You can do it from year to year, but we’ve
never seen folks come up with what I would consider a real valid comparative number
across organizations. Within an organization, you can come up with a number and you
can compare that year to year. I think the cost-benefits are typically dealt with on more
of a risk specific area, for example, cyber risk. (DRM)
Despite the high degree of acceptance of ERM at SecondoCo, however, the attitude
toward a risk seeking position at SecondoCo is not always effectively acted upon throughout the

98

organization, due to the presence of risk aversion in the environment: “that’s one of our
challenges even today, trying to remind people that we want to take on the right risks, and we
can’t make money without taking on risk” (MERBA). Additionally, defining the specific upside
value creation produced through ERM adoption is a challenging task for SecondoCo risk
professionals. While support of the policy and strategy of ERM is apparent, questions remain
about how the creation itself happens:
I’ve always taken the view, ‘does your ERM program create value? Can you quantify that
value?’ It’s a bit of a holy grail, and extremely hard to prove how you create value.
Enterprise risk management is nebulous to me as far as trying to identify the value
associated within it. It’s like people know intuitively. You know what’s happening here is
valuable because communication’s valuable, sharing information is valuable. To say it
prevented something from happening is very difficult to do. Also, there are services that
the ERM group provides that are clear. (MERBA)
Possible answers to the question of value creation at SecondoCo may come through several
avenues. First, a linkage to the holistic dimension of ERM:
I think what still remains to be done if you’re going to look at the upside of ERM and
where it adds value, is ideally you would be looking at the interplay between the various
risks that combine your overall risk profile and measure those. ERM practices in one
area may mitigate risk in another. But I think where people and companies have
struggled is in trying to measure the effect of those risks and the interplay between them.
(DRM)
Second, the increased quality of the organizational conversation around risk prompted by ERM
is another source:
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The real value is an open discussion that’s going on at the board level, the C-suite level,
where people are talking about these things. If you’re spending too much time trying to
develop some metric, you may be losing the real value of ERM, or diluting the real value,
which is in the dialogue. (DRM)
Lastly, the functional activities performed by the ERM organization offer a service to the firm
whereby incremental value is added through more robust environmental scanning:
The word that keeps coming to mind is that ‘support’ word. I think the value proposition
can be the same, but without the [ERM] program, you are rolling the dice a little bit. If
you don’t have that support network, you’re taking on risk so you’re exposed. You’re
going to have events happening. But you’re much more aware and you’re doing the best
you can to mitigate those where you need to. I think to the extent you didn’t have a
program, you’d be flying blind a little bit. (MERBA)
A cautionary note is sounded with respect to the role of value quantification, which is
interlaced with value creation issues:
I think another area where we differ from some other companies is in the quantification
of risks, especially when you’re talking about at the parent level because you get to so
many strategic type risks that I think are very challenging to try to quantify. You can do
it, but you put so many assumptions in there, I think it could be a greater risk that you put
reliance on it and what the results of that analysis may have been. (MERBA)
However, the evaluation of the upside benefit of measurement processes do not exclusively
determine ERM at SecondoCo: “We'll see development down both of those paths. I think the
quantification aspect is critical and that we do move forward on that, but there are the qualitative
aspects that have a long way to go” (DEM). Methodologically, there are several options
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identified by the company to explore value qualification, especially with respect to developing
data streams external to the organization:
But you can look across the industry, you can look by analogy, you can look at where
other losses have happened and other untoward events and get some sense. It’s not a
precise value measure, but I’m really seeing that it’s not all quantitative. (MERBA)
V.3.3.3 TerzoCo.
At the corporate policy level, TerzoCo expresses the value derived from ERM in a statement that
promotes a culture of communication:
The central value of an ERM program is found in its ability to provide an organization
with a systematic awareness of potential risk events. It does not generate intelligence, it
is a consumer of information provided by all parts of the organization and it all begins
with a conversation.
Prior to the adoption of ERM, the company
didn’t have the venue for the value to occur. We now have a ‘better bus’, in Jim Collins’
terms, and everyone is expected to get on. It’s a more intelligent, connected organization.
ERM is not trying to stop progress. We want to inform the group and challenge
assumptions. Our motto is, ‘it’s OK to be defeated, but never to be surprised.’ (CEM)
This new value in risk management is qualified in several different ways. First, at the
individual level are changes in behavior driven by the direct risk ownership responsibility in the
field. Second, risk identification and assessment processes have been clarified and made
consistent. Third, there is increased transparency around the potential impact of the individual
risks the company faces. Fourth, the dialog about risk issues has become deeper and more
meaningful, yielding fresh insights into the aggregate risk profile of the firm. Lastly,
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organizational knowledge and learning outcomes have resulted from the flow of information
across formalized communication channels.
TerzoCo as an indicator of value conducts no cost-benefit analyses, as the firm “doesn’t
know how to go about it” (SDRM). While there is some incremental cost incurred by ERM
adoption, theses additional expenses are below organizational thresholds for materiality. Beyond
cost-benefit considerations, however, there are
definitely positive and negative incentives with ERM that must be managed. For instance,
some risk owners may push their risks to the upper right quadrant of the corporate risk
map to make the case for resources, gaming the system. Others may seek to keep their
risks below the radar. There will always be bias in the system, which we’re working to
eliminate. (SDRM)
While the ERM program has prompted TerzoCo to “definitely think about upside and
become aware of the downside-upside character of risk, there are not many higher-level
examples of the upside. The majority of our effort is still to mitigate bad things” (SDRM). One
example is the voice of ERM at the table, directly contributing to strategic growth decisions and
the debate on whether to allocate capital to acquisitions or existing sources. Additionally, there
are
micro examples of areas to take more risk. If we can understand, quantify and charge for
risk, we should be able to do it. If you don’t have an ERM mentality, you won’t go there,
but if you do, maybe you can. We have potential high-risk areas in our business universe
where risk adverse decision makers may say ‘avoid’. It’s not about avoiding risk, but we
do need to get paid for the exposure. (SDRM)
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QuartoCo. As ERM was introduced into QuartoCo, even during the pre-2010 period the
question of value was prominent in the thinking of the firm’s risk professionals:
We talked about that from the very, very start. We wanted to try to highlight the benefit.
Like this is what the ‘gimme’ part of ERM is, so here’s what you’re going to get, there is
some upside benefit. I still think it’s hard. I still think that when you say, “risk
management,” most people do not see risk as an inherent up or down. They see risk as a
down. And when you’re talking about managing this down problem, that’s all the down
side of risk. (DRMQ)
Consequently, attempts to associate ERM upside value to contributing to the specific growth
prospects of the firm is a challenge:
Part of me recognizes that the company’s been managing risk for a very, very long time.
Before ERM was even born. And part of running the business is understanding how do
you grow the top line, which is kind of the upside piece. I think at least from my
experiences, the more natural conversation managing the downside. The upside is just
not as natural to people. As part of the strategic business planning process, they talk
about how they’re going to launch new products and how they’re going to have a new
portfolio and this is going to grow the topline. But I just don’t think it’s quite as explicit.
I’ve only found a few areas where people really talk about the upside. So for example, if
you think about macro trends of urbanization, people going from rural to urban.
(DRMQ)
Another of these areas where upside value discussions between the ERM function and the
business units have taken shape is the value of ERM to enhance preparedness:
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The thing that’s kind of interesting is, when you talk to the upside value, most people
think it’s kind of theoretical because they can’t quite understand how to do it. They say,
‘It sounds great, but what does it look like?’ So what I have found is what people
understand and resonates with them is the idea of being proactive. So to me that’s the
whole upside. If you’re better positioned to respond better than your competitor, it’ll
make sense and you’ll actually do better. So there’s an example of a natural disaster
where QuartoCo was [much better prepared than its competitor]. And my point is the
proactive piece is where people see the value. So you know when we’re talking to the
business units or anybody, the idea of being more proactive and prepared makes sense.
(DERM)
A direct contribution of ERM to the upside of the organization is in its engagement with
QuartoCo’s extensive vendor management system, which enables the business to consider new,
innovative partnerships:
There’s a lot of little projects that we do that they want to be able to go to a little one- or
two-person company, maybe working out of their den and get them to help us with
creating a look and feel for this brand in this country. And with that, there’s going to be
some downside risk, but the upside is we got to take a risk on being maybe the early
adopters of this new platform, but the upside is quite considerable for us. So I recognize
there’s risk, both up and down. They come to me as a part of the ERM group and say,
‘I’m very interested in the upside benefits of taking this jump, but I want you to help me
manage the downside of this very same risk.’ So I think what I love about that is that they
are being strategic and they are doing something that is new and different for the
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company, which inherently is a risk. And they want to do it because of the benefits and
they are also aware of managing and mitigating risk. (DRMQ)
From a strategic perspective at the executive level, the structured flow of information at
QuartoCo from ERM “is adding a little bit more rigor behind the process, some consistency. Our
role is to help them understand that there’s a confidence that we’ve identified in top risks, and
that helps inform their decisions” (DERM). Further,
they have a view toward what are the key risks for the company and how the key risk
owners bubble up the severity and frequency, the heat maps of these risks. It’s for them at
their level to put two and two together to say, “I see this bubbling up here. I see this
bubbling up here. I know our strategy is to go in this direction. This is something that
we’re going to have to put a work team against or focus on or think about more carefully
before we actually set the strategy in motion. (DRMQ)
V.4 Summary of Findings
The large organizations in this sample, PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo, have made
long-term commitments to the implementation of enterprise risk management (ERM) processes.
Their pursuit of ERM has been shown to follow a phased sequence of motivation, advancement,
and assimilation adapted from a process maturity model designed specifically for ERM
applications. Each firm, beyond the years of effort committed, has recognized ERM as being
fully engrained into its organization processes. At PrimoU, “ERM is now built into the fabric” of
the university. SecondoCo recognizes ERM to be “an established system of processes and
structures”, a program that is “rather deeply embedded”. TerzoCo characterizes ERM as having
become “culturally embedded in the organization as its ‘circulatory system’”, and that the
company “couldn’t take ERM out even if [it] wanted to”. QuartoCo states that ERM is “pretty
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well engrained in the culture”, citing that a material change has taken place over time in the
company with “25 percent of the board meetings 100 percent dedicated to ERM.”
Given the significant diversity of opinions on what ERM is, for the purpose of this study
ERM has been specified by an emerging consensus of three dimensions in the literature and not
by any single academic or industry framework, definition or set of protocols. With respect to the
alignment of ERM in PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo to this model, each firm has
embraced a holistic, integrated view of risk that spans the breadth and depth of their
organizational structures. Risk horizons in these institutions have expanded to encompass the
potential impact of both new and emerging risks, enabled by regular survey and profiling
processes that demand periodic reassessments of the risks facing the business. Harmonization of
the control- and also the value-based prospects conceptualized from the engagement in ERM,
where the duality of downside and upside outcomes occurs, evidence the perpetuation and
increased sophistication of downside control and mitigation mechanisms, and qualitatively
expressed upside value propositions. In the final chapter I will synthesize the research findings
and explicate the downside-upside duality through the lens of ambidexterity as a dynamic
capability to answer the research question, how do firms reconfigure assets, resources and
capabilities in the operationalization of ERM to consider both the downside and upside of risk?
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VI CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Two cross-sectional analyses developed in this study provide a basis for understanding what
ERM is and how it is operationalized in firms. In process terms, ERM is effectuated in a phased
sequence originating with organizational motivation and progressing through advancement
toward assimilation. Concomitantly, ERM aligns with a multidimensional model of silo
integration and horizon expansion activities, which in turn enable concurrent downside risk
mitigation and upside value generation. Having established conceptual and empirical foundations
for ERM, I present in this chapter a discussion of three findings that directly address the research
question: the nature of the downside-upside duality, specific resource reconfigurations that lead
firms to develop ambidexterity, and the generation of dynamic capabilities resulting from ERM
adoption. First, the downside risk control functions of the downside-upside duality, or loss
mitigation, are widely understood and accepted by scholars and practitioners. In contrast, the
upside component of ERM is described in numerous potentially beneficial outcomes, many of
which are conceptually reasonable and may well be valid, but are yet empirically untested. I will
specify boundaries for this upside, from which a value proposition for ERM can be asserted. In
so doing, this aspect of the duality will become more clearly defined on the basis of the evidence
developed in the instant research. Second, I identify from the case studies resource
reconfigurations in the form of institutional head starts, the perpetuation of TRM core
competencies, the economics of adoption, and functional leadership roles that enable
ambidexterity in ERM to become operationalized. Lastly, the emergence of dynamic capabilities
in the environments of the sample firms indicates a second upside value proposition, resulting
from management activities to adopt, implement and sustain ERM. The chapter concludes with a
presentation of the theoretical and practice contributions of this research.
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VI.1 Downside-Upside Duality
At the heart of this study is a duality, not previously explored in the ERM literature: how firms
configure resources in managing risk to control its downside effects while simultaneously
pursuing upside value benefits. To examine the duality and attendant reconfiguration activities,
however, we must first bring clarity to the upside value construct.
VI.2 Value of ERM
Conceptions of the value of ERM stretch across a wide spectrum of explicit expressions,
inferential references, and risk exploitation-as-value-generation categories, touching upon
virtually all areas of corporate activity. Improvements in firm performance (Gordon et al., 2009),
governance (Nocco & Stolz, 2006), decision making (Arena et al., 2010), strategy (Simkins,
2008), operations (Arena et al., 2011), and capital structure (Hoyt & Libenberg, 2011) are among
the many claims made by ERM proponents. For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to
establish boundaries around these ERM-created value claims such that the upside becomes
meaningful in the context of examining the management processes of large, non-financial
institutions in actual settings. I have considered five factors in the course of examining the data
for upside value: relativity, direction, industry, culture, range and quantification.
First, the upside contribution derived from ERM adoption should in relative terms be
incrementally greater than what is being achieved through TRM means. That is, in the TRM
mode such value is not and cannot be delivered in the execution of the firm’s contemporaneous
risk management activities (Rao & Marie, 2007). Absent this positive differential, ERM would
simply become a replication strategy for TRM with a different name. Second, the direction of the
value contribution is to the upside of risk. While acknowledging the ability of ERM to improve
downside risk mitigation, the emerging consensus proposes that “ERM assumes that firms
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should not just look at risk as a problem to mitigate; firms with a capability in managing a
particular risk should seek competitive advantage from it” (Bromiley et al., 2014). Third,
industry characteristics play a role in determining upside value. For example, banks and insurers
have access to data and models that enable value quantification in ways that are not readily
available to non-financial institutions. As such, non-financial institutions tend to be less oriented
around measurable interpretations of the upside of risk. Fourth, the cultural orientation of
management is a factor in the determination of value categorization. Mikes (2009) recognizes
differences in managerial attitudes and philosophies that shape “calculative cultures”, in which
either support or skepticism toward quantitatively directed ERM processes is evident. As a
result, divergent upside value profiles will likely be generated. Lastly, both quantitative and
qualitative descriptions of upside value are recognized in the literature, ranging from broadly
stated contributions to better-informed decision making to detailed measurements of positive
movement in share price. Thus, the lack of quantification does not preclude the attribution of
value to ERM activities.
Empirical evidence developed in this research indicates that upside value from ERM
beyond better downside control is recognized by the four organizations, but elusive: it is difficult
for risk professionals to define and measure. Guided by the boundaries set forth, I have identified
from the data a nuanced, upside value proposition of ERM that may be expressed as:
UVP1: ERM upside in the assimilation phase manifests as a raised level of risk discourse
throughout the firm, effectuated by enhanced management communication networks that
were not available prior to the adoption of ERM.
The currency flowing across these ERM enabled communication networks is risk data,
information and intelligence, of frequency, formality, complexity, transparency, and quality not
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possible in the pre-ERM state. This new standard of a robust dialog is accomplished as holistic,
and horizon adaptations are operationalized and communication paths between horizontal and
vertical structures are originated and refined. In each of the instant cases, advancing the
socialization aspects of risk management through long-term ERM assimilation of the elements of
the consensus model was noted as being significantly value enhancing. Risk professionals at
SecondoCo had concerns regarding an organizational reluctance toward risk information sharing
and created a risk profile process to overcome this challenge that became the basis for its ERM
program. The DRM at SecondoCo links holistic integration to upside value, made possible by a
willingness to conduct ERM with wide managerial inclusion and the promotion of a general
culture of risk awareness that facilities the speed and effectiveness of risk communications.
QuartoCo created a cross-functional, multinational approach to allow risk information to flow
freely around the company in multiple directions. These reconfigurations enable the proactivity
and preparedness to enhance competitive responses in the market that the DERM acknowledges
as being fundamental to upside value. TerzoCo advocates that ERM “begins with a
conversation”, placing the value of the organizational risk discourse at the center of its ERM
activities. The firm’s ERM program systematically consumes and distributes information from
all parts of the organization in support of an open, detailed risk conversation. PrimoU encourages
skip-level reporting of its RMPOs to the ERM executive committee, which fosters a climate of
ownership, transparency and accountability. Its ERM program is founded on a statement
recognizing the potentially positive attributes of risk, a principle that shaped the evolution of the
tone of risk conversations throughout the university.
While a more sophisticated risk discourse is evidentially an upside value proposition, the
data also suggests that the relationship between downside and upside is asymmetrical in large
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firms with 10 or more years of assimilation history of ERM adoption. That is, in the ERM mode,
organizational knowledge of and energy expended toward control and mitigation of risk tends to
be greater than that which is directed toward new prospects for value accretion exceeding the
improvements in the quality of the risk discourse. There are several potential explanations for
this phenomenon.
When firms are initially motivated to consider ERM, they do not seem to begin with
defined expectations of possible upside ERM value propositions, although a general awareness
of such advantages exits as was the case with SecondoCo and QuartoCo. Neither do companies
configure resources to achieve directly particular downside-upside harmonization ends nor do
they diminish existing downside control efforts. As the motivation-advancement-assimilation
process evolves, evidence indicates that resources are reconfigured to achieve holistic integration
and horizon expansion through a hybridized combination of structural, contextual and leadership
ambidexterity. Holistic integration of risk silos occurs along horizontal paths to link functional
areas, and vertically from the field level upward to executive management and boards of
directors. These processes involve the creation of new organizational structural subunits and
place risk ownership contextual demands upon risk professionals to manage an emerging
downside-upside duality, rather than one that has been established a priori. Risk horizons limited
by TRM path dependencies focused on existing risk categories in the organizations became
increasingly forward-looking through a wider aperture to encompass emerging, typically
uninsurable, operational and strategic risks, opening the door for future discussions of upside
possibilities.
Harmonization of the downside-upside duality shared several characteristics across the
sample. First, the downside control and mitigation features of TRM continued a parallel path to
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ERM adoption activities. In the case of SecondoCo, they were allowed to expand in a search for
potential risk solutions as the ERM domain became more complex holistically and larger in
scope as the risk horizon expanded. Next, despite the length of ERM experience of PrimoU
SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo, and the structural and contextual changes that have taken
place in these firms, the upside value component of ERM is a construct not defined
quantitatively. Measures of value ERM value were not being calculated by these institutions and
given the lack of recognized incremental costs to implement ERM, nor were cost-benefit
analyses of the effectiveness of ERM. Quantification of upside value in non-financial institutions
is a challenge, to the point of being characterized as the “holy grail” for SecondoCo and
TerzoCo. This research has stepped back from the market-level attempts at quantitative
associations of ERM to firm performance, to instead focus on the management effects of ERM.
In adopting an e-r-M approach, I have identified several resource deficiencies that may
contribute to these quantification difficulties. First, voluntarily imposed constraints in the
adoption of ERM were found in each sample firm. Little in the way of investment in external
sources of ERM competencies was brought into the ERM effort, which are management
decisions with positive and negative consequences. On the plus side, the risk professionals
responsible for embedding ERM, as insiders, were culturally sensitized and highly
knowledgeable about the firm’s operational processes. In a negative frame, the lack of external
perspectives on how to envision and articulate the upside, or to challenge conventional thinking
or organizational biases around the subject of risk from may be factors in the lagging
articulations of value.
Second, ERM practices have the ability to generate large quantities of risk data, far in
excess of what is being produced by TRM sources in its support of annual insurance transaction

112

cycles. Various types of ERM pre-and post-loss risk analyses, including heat maps, profiling,
and risk appetite, tolerance and threshold calculations play a crucial role in providing deeper
insight into the individual risks and the overall risk profile of the firm. However, the data sources
linking these analyses with activities and results are not without gaps. One example is
uncollected data. For example, a popular ERM value claim is its contribution to improved
strategic decision-making (Elliott, 2013, p. 1.23; Segal, 2011, p. 226). This claim may well be
true in part or total. To quantify, or to properly qualify such a contribution, we would need
insight into how ERM influences, impacts or directs the decision process, to what extent and to
what end. Absent these difficult-to-track data, misleading or false attribution in favor of the value
ERM become concerns. Another example is that of uncollectable data, which arises from the
counterfactual nature of the effect of management control processes (Baron, 1999; Epstude &
Roese, 2008). Conceptually, the imposition of an ERM program could prevent a loss from
happening—control the downside—in a way that TRM would not have had the organizational
reach to do so. Alternatively, ERM could facilitate entry into a new market —contribute to the
upside—without that the expansion would not have moved forward. For example, newly
established ERM communication paths can enable the timely and efficient movement of holistic
risk information to inform strategic decision makers and reduce uncertainty. In both cases, the
credit may indeed be valid, but virtually impossible to prove. The MERBA at SecondoCo
expressly recognized this issue.
Despite the years of work and effort extended to embed ERM into PrimoU, SecondoCo,
TerzoCo, and QuartoCo, the relationship of holistic and horizon reconfiguration activities to
harmonization of the duality appear fairly inelastic. These firms have managed a deep
assimilation of ERM into their environments by integrating silos and extending horizons but
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without creating equally well developed upside value constructs. Nonetheless, they continue to
have aspirations to do so, despite the front-end definitional and back-end tracking deficiencies
that create limitations on expressing upside value propositions. Thus, of the three dimensions
composing the emerging consensus model (Bromiley et al., 2014), the holistic and horizon
elements have been demonstrably actionable, and downside-upside harmonization is an outcome
derived from those actions.
I now turn to an examination of several resource reconfigurations in the ERM adoption
process that facilitate ambidexterity.
VI.3 Resource Reconfiguration and Ambidexterity
VI.3.1 Head starts.
Several of the motivations for adopting ERM identified in the course of this research are among
those generally referenced in the literature, such as major events (Paté-Cornell, 2012), inposition risk managers (RIMS, 2013), rating agency requirements (RIMS, 2013) and senior
management influences (Meulbroek, 2002). Upon closer analysis, we find that three of the four
companies in this study had developed sophisticated practices outside of the TRM domain that
accelerated the initial acceptance of ERM into their firms. Clinical risk managers at PrimoU
were, for the most part, conducting ERM without being aware of the industry taxonomy (Fraser
& Simkins, 2005; Rao & Marie, 2007). They engaged in sophisticated risk management
behaviors and processes, which the non-healthcare divisions of the university were later able to
emulate. At SecondoCo, the dedicated, pre-ERM quantitative analysis resources in the energy
trading and marketing area became part of the core of the firm’s new centralized, corporate ERM
group. This shift provided the ERM function with a desirable technical capability and introduced
innovative thinking about risk beyond that which was resident in the existing TRM area.
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Integrated risk financing competency at QuartoCo contributed greatly to preparing the climate in
the company for ERM. It established a replicable model of what “good” looked like in risk
management, from which an ERM professional was able to advance the ERM effort and begin to
benchmark quality. ERM in TerzoCo and QuartoCo had its origins in their respective corporate
security groups, the visibility of which facilitated global reach and operational access with a
robust management imprimatur. Leveraging these institutional head starts on ERM adoption
illustrates how management capitalizes on reconfiguring existing resources to promote ERM
through internal channels and to activate ambidexterity.
VI.3.2 TRM perpetuation.
PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo began their journeys to ERM with well-defined
legacy TRM departments in place, each of which retained its identity, staffing and existing roles
and responsibilities as ERM moved forward. At PrimoU, the incumbent TRM director was
involved with ERM from the start and eventually became the titular CRO, but also continued to
maintain a distinct TRM identity as well. ERM at SecondoCo was developed outside of the TRM
domain, which continued to operate as usual, through the reassignment of a professional from the
treasury department with experience in energy trading risk control. At TerzoCo, the TRM
director was a powerful influence in the initiation of the company’s ERM efforts, and later spun
off the function from TRM to facilitate close alignment with the company’s audit and
compliance groups. QuartoCo’s TRM department had developed in its integrated risk financing
program a transactional framework that approximated ERM, but this unit did not assume the
responsibility for launching and directing ERM. Instead, ERM moved forward with the
introduction of a full-time professional who came with a major acquisition. In each case, a new
structural unit or units became necessary to introduce ERM into the organizational mix. Existing
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downside control and mitigation focused TRM departments, with their insurance path
dependencies and core competencies (Dionne, 2013; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Rao & Marie,
2007) remained intact, but no longer dominated the corporate risk management agenda. ERM
configurations assumed the primary risk management leadership position in the eyes of board
members and executives.
VI.3.3 Economics of ERM.
During the resource structural reconfiguration process the economics of ERM adoption became
apparent, which is a management consideration of ERM research having received little attention.
Each company made minimal, if any, direct investments in major expense categories such as
additional staffing or external consulting. From an information technology standpoint, early
expenditures made by QuartoCo in the pre-2010 period were not supported. The use and cost of
risk management software in the assimilation phase of the other firms was not observed. Scale
advantages played a role to expand risk management utility, since these large organizations were
able to house specialized, potentially fungible risk management resources to respond to changes
in demand caused by environmental shifts. Nonetheless, the lack of identifiable incremental cost
elements is an unexpected finding and raises questions of clarification in response to research
suggesting that implementing an ERM program is not costless (Pagach & Warr, 2010b). This
particular study did not explore the economics of ERM issue in its sample of mostly utilities and
financial institutions and there may be industry effects differentiating financial and non-financial
firms. Decisions to leverage existing assets, which included the serendipitous arrival of an
experienced ERM professional at QuartoCo, and the maintenance of overall risk management
budget neutrality through resource shifting were deliberately made by senior managers at each of
the firms. Indirect costs resulting from the organizational friction of change management,
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exemplified by process and systems integration activity, increases in meeting frequency and
internal reporting, additional travel to roll out and sustain interest in ERM at the field level,
executives’ and board members’ oversight, and opportunity costs for those that took on new
ERM responsibilities part-time are not being tracked, and the materiality of such costs is
unknown. This lack of emphasis on financial measurement, however, may have enabled an
organic movement toward ERM to take place, unencumbered by demands to justify ERM
adoption financially. Nonetheless, either on a gross cost or a direct cost only basis, cost-benefit
analyses of ERM are difficult to calculate and were not attempted by the firms in this research. In
summary, ERM has indeed been an organic undertaking, evidencing low levels of consultant
propulsion and favoring internal asset reassignments over the acquisition of external resources.
VI.3.4 Functional leadership.
A sub-stream of ERM literature (Aabo et al., 2005; Beasley et al., 2008; Libenberg & Hoyt,
2003; Mikes, 2008; Pagach & Warr, 2010a) focuses on the emergence and contributions of chief
risk officers (CRO) with the advent of ERM. Functional leadership of ERM programs varied
across the sample. Two of the companies in this study appointed CROs: PrimoU granted the title
to the incumbent TRM director, although at the same level of the organizational hierarchy, and
the CFO at SecondoCo simply assumed the additional title. Neither TerzoCo nor QuartoCo
appointed CROs, instead choosing to direct ERM from management positions in which ultimate
authority and responsibility for firm-wide risk management activities and performance was not
concentrated. The relative lack of status of the CRO position in this group of cases may reflect its
non-financial institution composition, as banks and insurers have appeared more likely to invest
in new, full-time professionals upon which to focus institutional risk ownership. None of the
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firms staffed their ERM leadership roles externally but drew on existing internal resources
assigned to revised organizational structures to accomplish this task.
VI.3.5 Ambidexterity.
By progressing from motivation through advancement and then to states of assimilation, the
large institutions in this study underwent substantial modifications in their respective
environments to situate ERM. Changes in structural boundaries directly affected the risk
management domain, creating parallel TRM-ERM functions where full-time risk professionals
reside. Further, the operational areas of the companies were impacted, as they were adjusted to
include non-exclusively dedicated managers of risk, such as the RMPOs at PrimoU. As a result,
ownership of risk shifted from the dispersion characteristic of the TRM mode to a more sharply
defined sense of individual accountability. These reconfiguration mechanics introduced new
ERM subunits—departments, working groups, committees and councils that did not exist in the
pre-ERM era, and were accomplished horizontally by connecting risk ownership across business
units, and vertically with hierarchical linkage of progressively larger scopes of management
oversight and responsibility. In so doing, ERM became operationalized and positioned to do that
which TRM on its own does not accomplish. This alteration of organizational architecture to
enable the simultaneous pursuit of downside risk control and upside value propositions points
toward the emergence of structural ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976; Bushe & Shani, 1991;
Goldstein, 1985; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).
Individual capabilities were stretched both within the risk management professional asset
base of PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo, as well as in the operational areas of these
firms. This stretching from an operational viewpoint occurred as ownership of newly expanded
risk management responsibilities migrated to business unit managers. ERM adoption demands
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new skills (Blaskovitch & Taylor, 2011), and the skills to effectuate it were drawn from and
applied across the length and breadth of the organizations. As the TRM and ERM professionals
and operational managers participated in firm-wide ERM implementation efforts, contextual
ambidexterity was demonstrated in the processes and systems that guided the risk management
activities of these individuals (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Further,
support from the highest levels of management, including executive management and the board
of directors, is necessary to promote and sustain interest in ambidexterity. Lubatkin et al. (2006)
identify these distinct contributions as leadership ambidexterity, a related, yet independent
antecedent from structural and contextual ambidexterity. In each of the cases examined
hereunder, the boards of directors were regularly engaged in the conduct of ERM in their
respective firms, as was executive management.
Based on the empirical data developed in this study, the role of ambidexterity in ERM is
multifaceted and the forms, interdependent. Absent either the structural ambidexterity necessary
to reconfigure horizontal and vertical organizational units, or the contextual ambidexterity that
enables the execution of new risk management principles, activities and ownership, or the
leadership ambidexterity committed to sustaining ERM processes from the highest levels of
management, there would be a low probability of ERM progressing to a state of duality-based
assimilation. This combination of forms, or hybridized ambidexterity, is an adaptation of the
temporal switching between structural and contextual ambidexterity noted by O’Reilly and
Tushman (2013). In the instant cases, structure, context and leadership ambidexterity elements
coexist over time rather than shift back and forth. Further, the hybridization of the forms appears
to be a nested property (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013). It occurs at multiple organizational levels
simultaneously: from field-level operational managers entrusted with risk ownership and
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reporting responsibilities and upwards through risk committees and councils, into the C-suite and
ultimately the board of directors. To the issue of how this nested, hybridized ambidexterity is
operationalized (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013), the evidence from an e-r-M point of view indicates
that the downside and upside are more likely balanced, with TRM and ERM coexisting, but not
competing, rather than traded off, as in the manner of a conceptual contra liability account. For
example, each of the firms internally reconfigured resources to adopt ERM and also decided to
continue with full TRM capabilities without regard to offsetting one approach against the other.
Also, this downside-upside duality appears to be simply managed rather than reconciled, as no
efforts to calculate cost-benefit analyses were observed in any of the firms. Leverage of existing
resources plays a significant role in the operationalization process, with ERM having a strong
organic character independent of proof of value measurements.
VI.4 Dynamic Capabilities
Over the years of building and maintaining sophisticated TRM departments, PrimoU,
SecondoCo, TerzoCo and QuartoCo developed strong sets of core competencies (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008) in the conduct of their legacy risk management functions. These operational
(Zollo & Winter, 2002) or zero-level capabilities (Winter, 2003) are routines that enable the
firms to compete in contemporaneous environments (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In the case of
TRM, core competencies are those that serve to reduce financial uncertainty with respect to
insurable loss exposures, through risk financing schemes and risk control activities. Desired
outcomes from these capabilities focus on maximizing cost of risk efficiency and minimizing
failures to detect, finance and recover from losses. Maintaining such core competencies depends
upon routinized processes that become firmly rooted to enhance operational predictability. With
this embedment also comes certain path dependencies, most notably the strong association, and,
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in fact, the perceived limitation of the corporate risk management function to the administration
of commercial insurance programs.
Each of the sample companies demonstrated long-term, ongoing resource commitments
to preserving these core competencies. However, such commitments did not preclude them from
developing new risk management routines at a higher organizational level (Winter, 2003; Zollo,
2003) that enabled the firms to construct, interlace and reassemble competencies to respond to
changing environmental conditions (Teece et al., 1997). These distinct activities, or dynamic
capabilities, carried out by PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo are descriptive of the
locus of change from TRM to the adoption and implementation of ERM. Recognizing the
similarities between the two management processes, Nair et al. (2013) argue that the coinciding
properties of ERM and dynamic capabilities establish ERM as a dynamic capability. Utilizing
the ambidexterity lens of this research to extend the authors’ work, I propose a second ERM
upside value proposition:
UVP2: dynamic capabilities are generated through hybridized ambidexterity in the longterm assimilation of ERM as firms encounter a downside-upside duality in their
environments.
One of the most significant attributes of ERM in comparison to TRM is that based on
empirical data, even after ten or more years of engagement it is inaccurate to characterize ERM
as a core competency. There are several factors supporting the alignment of ERM with dynamic
capabilities. First, ERM at PrimoU, SecondoCo, TerzoCo, and QuartoCo would not be
sustainable without ongoing high-level support, whereas TRM on its own has been and continues
to be managed effectively without such involvement. Second, ERM adoption shifted the cultural
perception, and with it, the organizational practice of risk management away from the path
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dependencies of insurance purchasing and downside loss mitigation. Lesser importance is not
attributed to these two functions but rather the engagement in ERM underscores the difference
between risk-based core competencies and dynamic capabilities. Third, as ERM reshapes the
firms’ risk horizons, they become more able to sense opportunities and threats to resolve
concerns over unknown hazards. Fourth, executive managers, with the benefit of new, holistic
communication networks carrying more detailed risk information are better equipped to make
decisions to quickly seize opportunities and reconfigure assets (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008) in
response to turbulence in competitive environments. Lastly, the relationships among ERM
adoption, the downside-upside duality, ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities are unique to the
ERM domain and are effectuated when firms seek mobilize assets for gain beyond that which is
produced by core competencies.
In summary, large firms having been motivated to adopt ERM and advance its
implementation to a state of assimilation address the existence of a downside-upside duality in
their operating environments. In this duality, legacy downside risk controls coalesce with upside
value benefits. Empirical evidence indicates that firms reconfigure their resources through a
hybridization of structural, contextual and leadership ambidexterity that holistically integrates
risks and widens the boundaries of the risk horizon. Further, as this ambidexterity takes place,
core competencies are preserved but path dependencies based upon legacy risk management
limitations are overcome. Upside value propositions emerge in the raising of the level of the risk
discourse in organizations, and in the generation of dynamic capabilities that enable firms to
sense, seize and reconfigure resources for competitive advantage.
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VI.5 Contributions
Despite the breadth of its body of literature, ERM has rarely seen the application of theories of
collective action explicate its impact on firms. Stepping back from the variance analyses that
seek to quantify the relationship between ERM and firm performance, I have responded to calls
in the literature to unpack in greater detail the ERM mix (Mikes & Kaplan, 2014). This is the
first study to employ a combination of a phased ERM adoption approach based upon capability
maturity models (Van Looy et al., 2013) and the operationalization of an emerging consensus
definition of ERM (Bromiley et al., 2014). ERM produces effects that can be characterized as a
downside-upside duality of risk management. Substituting this duality as a proxy for exploitation
and exploration (Junni et al., 2013), this research, also for the first time, uses ambidexterity as a
dynamic capability to explore the operationalization of ERM in firms. Empirical evidence
indicates that ambidexterity is achieved through the hybridization of structural, contextual and
leadership modes (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013) as resources are reconfigured and capabilities
stretched to establish ERM, which is balanced and managed as opposed to traded off and
reconciled. This finding responds to demands for a more transparent understanding of the
operationalization of ambidexterity (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013). Further, economic leverage of
internal resources appears to have a significant role in establishing ambidexterity. Extending the
research argument that ERM constitutes a dynamic capability (Nair et al., 2013), I propose that
the risk management ambidexterity is effectuated in firms, dynamic capabilities result, enabling
organizations to sense, seize and reconfigure resources to respond to changes in their
environments.
As firms seek to manage effectively the fit, form and function of ERM, this study offers
guidance from the long-term experiences of large, committed organizations and senior risk
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practitioners as to how firms configure to achieve the control and value propositions of ERM
simultaneously. Early stage adopters will benefit from understanding the complexities of
quantifying the upside, and become familiar with several key value-producing activities
supported by empirical evidence. This research will inform managers on the challenges to
measuring the cost-benefit of ERM adoption, and the importance of leverage, both economic and
capability, in the embedment of ERM in organizations.
The findings of this research also assist in clarifying breaks in the value chain of ERM.
These discontinuities originate from inadequate definitions and unclear expectations of the
upside, unsuccessful attempts to conceptualize and quantify value as firms advance and
assimilate ERM, and several missing value-based data streams. The combination of these factors
introduce endogeneity into the system, create difficulties in testing and measuring the efficacy of
ERM, and negatively impact the validity of attempts to quantify an ERM to firm performance
relationship.

124

VII CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The logic of ERM implicit in its acronym that firms should seek to manage risks across the
breadth and depth of their enterprises, has rarely been challenged in the literature and finds
enthusiastic support in the cottage industry of ERM practitioners and consultants. Below this
threshold of near universal conceptual acceptance, however, still exist fundamental questions:
What exactly is ERM? How do firms practice it? What is the real organizational value achieved
by engaging in it? In this study, I have attempted to deal with the fundamentals from a different
direction than the general flow of ERM research, and examined companies whose professionals
have spent many years in the trenches of their organizations doing the hard work of changing the
people and processes that face risk. Evidence indicates that on one level, the work has paid off.
We observe that risk management in firms can be advanced from its traditional, functionally
discrete insurance-, loss mitigation- and treasury-based roots to a state where its presence is felt
in new ways on the entirety of a business. Variations in how the advancement occurs are
considerable. Even given an informed, emerging consensus of ERM, to paraphrase a popular
saying, “When you’ve seen ERM at one organization, you’ve seen ERM at one organization.” I
hope that by explicating a consensus view of ERM through ambidexterity and dynamic
capabilities that the management processes to embed ERM have become clearer and motivate
additional research using other theories of collective action.
On another level, there is still much work to do. ERM may be declared a success from
one standpoint, but still fall short of its promise from another. Imbalances in downside-upside
duality, and moreover, the general agreement that ERM produces value but the lack of rigor in
proving it may be deleterious to the sustainment of ERM. Ongoing investment constraints,
organizational fatigue, and diminishing returns are operational risks to any management process
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that is ultimately unable to articulate clearly its worth. A somewhat paradoxical situation exists:
the formidable quantification tools brought to bear on downside risk assessment have done little
to improve measurements of upside value. Perhaps as the field of predictive analytics utilizing
big data continues to evolve counterfactual and decision-making modeling can be developed,
creating proxies and virtual peers against which the actual ERM experiences of firms can be
compared and evaluated. Research into filling in the data gaps, admittedly a difficult task, may
be part of the solution to overcoming the “galloping endogeneity” (C. Ciccotello, personal
communication, March 12, 2015) that affects the relationship between ERM and firm
performance.
VII.1 Limitations
There are several limitations in this study that may provide for future research opportunities.
First, though interviews were conducted at multiple firms, the responses from the individual risk
professionals at any given firm may be biased in some way that would be mitigated in a single
case study with a larger number of subjects having more diverse recollections. Second, the
research will involve retrospective data, which again could be subject to bias, filtering or faulty
memory. Longitudinal case studies using the same theoretical framework, but having access to
real-time observational data from multiple subjects may yield a higher degree of reliability.
Third, the heterogeneous sample of non-financial industry public companies chosen may produce
findings that differ from other firms due primarily to capital structure, size or specific industry
sector. Fourth, the focus of this research is on organizations that have made commitments to
ERM adoption and have had a measure of success with the approach. What of firms with
negative experiences? Those companies having decided against moving forward with ERM as a
result of their due diligence processes, or perhaps have abandoned efforts to sustain the practice
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of ERM in the advancement phase because of a lack of perceived value or an inability to
reconfigure resources would provide an interesting, contrary perspective for future studies. Fifth,
leverage of existing assets played a key role in how ERM moved forward on a staffing and
budget neutral basis. Equally large firms choosing to use external consultants or invest in ERM
talent may have different outcomes, particularly in dealing with questions of value to justify the
added expense. Further, the speed of the adoption process may differ. Between-case comparisons
of organic and ERM capability seeking groups will provide a finer grained picture of changes in
the economics of ERM affect value realization and if different economics impact the time
required for assimilation.
Lastly, while not a subject of this study, the association of culture with ERM has
appeared in the literature (Cooper et al., 2013; Kimbrough & Componation, 2009) and was
observed in the data. Some of the adoption leaders of ERM felt it important to match the ERM
effort to the existing cultural priorities of the organization. Nonetheless, ERM represents a break
from traditional notions of risk management and demands cultural change from emphasis on the
local to embracing the global. Future research into the cultural dynamics of ERM, particularly in
the ways that culture either enhances or impedes assimilation or hybridized ambidexterity would
introduce new viewpoints on the upside value proposition of ERM.
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Appendix B: Sample Interview Protocol

Sample Interview Protocol
Study #H15157 | Interview #00X | Day and date, 2015

o Welcome and introductions
-

Signed IC form

-

Record your views, opinions, perspectives, insights, experiences

o General Statement
The subject of this research project is that of risk management in large organizations. This study
will examine a small sample of institutions that have transitioned from a traditional approach to
managing risk, or TRM, to the more sophisticated approach of enterprise risk management, or
ERM. Each of these firms is considered to be experienced practitioners of ERM, having
demonstrated multi-year commitments to embedding ERM into their respective operations.
o Purpose Statement
In navigating from TRM to ERM, firms must reconfigure their assets, resources and capabilities
to align with the organizational goals that motivate the adoption and sustainment of ERM. The
purpose of this study is to explore how these reconfigurations are accomplished in light of
specific management theories of collective action.
o Interview topical flow to shape exploration
Demographic information
From TRM to ERM: Motivation, advancement, and assimilation
The emerging consensus: holistic, horizon, harmonization
Duality: Downside control – upside value
Ambidexterity: structural, contextual, leadership
Dynamic capabilities: level of competency

142

o Interview questions
1. Personal profile – professional level-set
a. Years of experience in RM
b. Years with current organization
c. Role, responsibility, reporting
d. Size of staff and expense budget
e. Estimated cost-of-risk for organization

2. Describe the pre-ERM environment at your organization to establish historical context
a. RM 7-S
i. Strategy, structure, systems, skills, staff, style, risk philosophy

3. When you reflect back on the initial MOTIVATION for adopting ERM,
a. When
b. Who/what drove the decision
c. Goals and expectations
d. Vision of RM contributing to broader organizational strategy or performance?
e. General acceptance or resistance?

4. As ERM began to ADVANCE, how did changes to RM-specific assets, resources and
capabilities take place [keep in mind structural/contextual/leadership ambidexterity]?
a. Roles, responsibilities, reporting
b. Investment
c. Training
d. Hiring
e. New skill acquisition
f. Technology

5. In its current state, describe the level of ASSIMILATION of ERM in the organization
a. Program, initiative, or “way of doing business”
b. Have expectations, goals and/or vision changed? If so, how?
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c. Annual budget/funding for ERM
6. What role, if any, do basic economic considerations play in the ERM process?
a. Use of incentives
b. Are they linked to risk ownership?
c. Is the ERM program subject to cost/benefit analysis?
d. Rewards/penalties

7. There are many different definitions, frameworks, models and approaches to ERM. Examples
include COSO and ISO31000. Did your organization adopt or adapt any of them?
a. If so, why; if not, why not?
b. Level of influence or impact

8. The ERM literature is very broad, and addressed in numerous arenas. The evidence suggests
that there is an emerging consensus of three foundational elements that are core to ERM.
Please asses how each applies (or not) to your organization
a. 1st - Holistic - integration of risk silos
i. balance of quantitative and qualitative culture? [Mikes’ “calculative culture”]
b. 2nd - Horizon - existing and emerging risks
i. sense, seize, reconfigure
9. 3rd element – Harmonization – recognizing the “downside” and “upside” of risk, and by
extension, RM
a. Does this construct resonate with you in concept?
i. How would you define downside [control and compliance]?
ii. How would you define upside [value and performance]?
b. Do these align with your organizational approach to ERM?
i. If so, how
ii. if not, was it not a factor or considered and rejected?
c. How would you assess the organizational effort allocated to downside and upside?
d. Are there measures of value or contributions to firm performance recognized?
e. Would contributions to strategy, strategic planning or SDM fit a value definition?
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10. Revisit the current mode of operationalization of ERM in your organization, in light of any
value contributions, e.g., strategy, strategic planning, SDM, FP beyond risk
control/mitigation; are they driven primarily by:
a. [structural]: committees, departments
b. [contextual]: leveraged roles and responsibilities
c. [leadership]: team at the top

11. At the current level of ERM practice, how do risk management routines and processes differ
from the pre-ERM era?
a. Have the previous, core processes been expanded, abandoned, replaced, morphed,
e.g., traditional loss control/risk financing/claims administration cycle
b. Do the new processes better position the organization for competitiveness and
survival?
c. The counterfactual issue: Absent ERM, would the organization less
viable/competitive/successful?

12. What are your sustainment plans for the future of ERM?
a. “doing things better” or “doing better things”?
b. does ERM become de-identified to the point that assimilation is complete, and it no
longer exists as a discrete, identifiable function?

13. Is there any additional information you would like to share about ERM that might provide
further insight, or areas that should be addressed?

14. Would it be possible to obtain a current ERM deployment chart, and copies of any relevant
internal communications that would provide additional details?

15. Do you have any final comments? Thank you very much for your time and perspectives on
ERM.
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